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KNOWING HOW TO KNOW: SECONDARY LIABILITY
FOR SPEECH IN COPYRIGHT LAW
LauraA. Heymann*

Contributorycopyright infringement has long been based
on whether the defendant, "with knowledge of the infringing
activity," induced, caused, or materially contributed to
another's infringing conduct. But few court opinions or
scholarly articles have given due consideration to what it
means to "know" of someone else's infringing conduct,
particularlywhen the unlawfulness at issue cannot truly exist
until a legal judgment occurs. How can one "know," in other
words, that a court or jury will deem a particular use
infringement rather than de minimis or fair use? At best,
contributory defendants engage in a predictive exercise-in
some cases, a more certain one, to be sure, but a predictive
exercise nonetheless. To recognize this is not a mere semantic
excursion: once a decision maker has determined that
infringement has occurred, it is more likely, through
hindsight bias, to determine that a defendant 1new" of this
infringement at the relevant time, despite the realities of
monitoringand assessing content.
Drawingon both the legal and epistemologicalliterature,
this Article recommends a better framing for the issue of
knowledge in contributory infringement doctrine-an
approachthat has implicationsnot only for copyright law but
for the regulation of online content more generally.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During the 2008 presidential election season-when online
campaign-related activity took place at nowhere near the level it does
now-Senator John McCain's campaign wrote a letter to YouTube,
disputing YouTube's removal of a number of campaign videos for
alleged copyright infringement.1 The campaign claimed that the
videos included "fewer than ten seconds of footage from news
broadcasts .

.

. as a basis for commentary on the issues presented in

the news reports, or on the reports themselves," which constituted
"paradigmatic examples of fair use." 2 YouTube had removed the
videos upon receipt of a claim of copyright infringement pursuant to
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")3-a claim that the
campaign viewed as "both unfortunate and unnecessary." 4 " [N]othing
in the DMCA," wrote the campaign, "requires a host like YouTube to
comply automatonically [sic] with takedown notices, while blinding
itself to their legal merit (or, as here, their lack thereof)," particularly
"in the context of a fast-paced political campaign." 5 The campaign
thus asked YouTube to commit to a "full legal review of all takedown
notices on videos posted from accounts controlled by (at least) political
candidates and campaigns" and to decline to respond to notices that
it determined, after such a review, were without legal merit. 6
"Surely," the campaign asserted, "the protection of core political
speech, and the protection of the central role YouTube has come to
play in the country's political discourse, is worth the small amount of
additional legal work our proposal would require."7
In her response, YouTube's chief counsel pointed out that while
the DMCA's notice, takedown, and counter-notice structure
undoubtedly results in some abuse of the system, further efforts on
1. Letter from Trevor Potter, Gen. Counsel, McCain-Palin 2008, to Chad
Hurley, CEO, YouTube (Oct. 13, 2008), https://amlawdaily.typepad.com
/amlawdaily/files/mccain-letter-20081013.pdf.
2. Id.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018). The relevant statutory scheme is officially titled
the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, but courts and
commentators alike typically refer to it by the name of the overall legislation. See
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 201, 112 Stat. 2877
(1998).
4. Letter from Trevor Potter, supra note 1.
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id.
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YouTube's behalf to reduce legal error were not feasible. "[A] detailed
substantive review of every DMCA notice is simply not possible due
to the scale of YouTube's operations," she wrote. 8
Any such review would have to include a determination of
whether a particular use is a "fair use" under the law, which is
a complex and fact-specific test that requires the subjective
balancing of four factors.

. .

. No number of lawyers could

possibly determine with a reasonable level of certainty whether
all the videos for which we receive disputed takedown notices
qualify as fair use. 9

The response from YouTube's counsel is even more
understandable now than it was at the time. As one point of
comparison, a 2017 study reported that, in early 2016, Google was
receiving "between 17 and 21 million [takedown] requests a week for
its Web Search service." 10 In terms of sheer volume, the kind of
review requested by the McCain campaign would be impossible with
even a fraction of the submissions. But the response also suggests a
more fundamental problem with this review: determining whether a
claim of infringement is correct is not always possible to do "with a
reasonable level of certainty." In some instances, a reviewer with a
basic understanding of copyright law might accurately predict how a
court would rule-perhaps for the classic music file trading scenario
or a video of an entire television episode, posted without commentary,
on YouTube. But there are instances when the use of an entire
copyrighted work has been deemed fair use, even without
commentary or other transformation; 1 1 without training on such
issues and time to properly consider them, these considerations
become more complicated and proxies become less useful.
Two more recent examples further highlight the uncertainty in
predicting determinations of infringement. One involves the question
of how copyright law responds to new technologies. In March 2006,
Cablevision announced the availability of a remote DVR system,
8.

Gen.

Letter from Zahavah Levine, Chief Counsel, YouTube, to Trevor Potter,

Counsel, McCain-Palin

2008

(Oct. 14, 2008),

http://www.dmlp.org

/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/08-10-14YouTube%20Response%20to%20Sen.
%20McCain.pdf.

9. Id.
10.

JENNIFER M. URBAN ET AL., NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE

32 (2017).
11. E.g., Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 84
(2d Cir. 2014) ("In the context of news reporting and analogous activities ... the
need to convey information to the public accurately may in some instances make
it desirable and consonant with copyright law for a defendant to faithfully
reproduce an original work without alteration."); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v.
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) ("The use of a copyrighted
work need not alter or augment the work to be transformative in nature. Rather,
it can be transformative in function or purpose without altering or actually
adding to the original work.").
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whereby Cablevision customers could record television programming
for later viewing on servers maintained by Cablevision, rather than
on a set-top box. 12 Cablevision's system seemed to have been
designed with avoiding liability for copyright infringement in mind;
each customer's recordings were saved to separate server space
allocated to that customer, and each customer viewed only those
copies when playback was requested. 1 3 Cartoon Network and other
content owners alleged, inter alia, that the playback of programming
in response to customers' requests constituted an infringing public
performance. 14 Not so, said the Second Circuit: "Because each RSDVR playback transmission is made to a single subscriber using a
single unique copy produced by that subscriber, we conclude that such
transmissions are not performances 'to the public,' and therefore do
not infringe any exclusive right of public performance." 15
Aereo, Inc., some years later, offered to New York City
subscribers-i.e., in the Second Circuit-a service by which
subscribers could watch local television programming over the
internet. From the subscribers' perspective, this system "function[ed]
much like a television with a remote Digital Video Recorder ("DVR")
and [a] Slingbox." 16 No doubt deeply familiar with the court's opinion
in Cartoon Network, Aereo set up its system with separate antennas
for each subscriber, creating individual copies of each program
transmitted.1 7 The Second Circuit, relying on its opinion in Cartoon
Network, likewise held that Aereo's transmissions were not public
performances.1 8 But this result was reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Without discussing Cartoon Network, the majority held that
the technology underlying the system's structure was irrelevant;
what mattered was Congress's "regulatory objectives," Aereo's
"commercial objective," and the "viewing experience of Aereo's
subscribers"-none of which distinguished Aereo's system from that
of a cable operator. 19 Thus, the Court concluded, just as a cable
system engages in a public performance of the programming it
transmits-and is required by statute to obtain a license for that
transmission-so did Aereo. 20

12. Cartoon Network LP, LLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d
Cir. 2008).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 134.
15. Id. at 139.
16. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014).

17. Id. at 680-81.
18.

Id. at 695.

19. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 446. Justice Scalia's dissent cited Cartoon Network
several times. Id. at 452-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 451. On remand, the district court entered a preliminary
injunction; Aereo later filed for bankruptcy. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., Nos.
12-cv-1540, 12-cv-1543, 2014 WL 5393867 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014); Emily Steel,
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The other example involves a determination of fair use. In 2011,
Russell Brammer, a photographer specializing in stock photography,
took a time-lapse photograph of the Adams Morgan neighborhood in
Washington, D.C., at night, which he posted to Flickr. 2 1 The
organizer of an annual film festival found the photograph online and
posted it to the festival's website for attendees. 22 After successfully
getting the festival's organizer to take down the photo, Brammer filed
suit for copyright infringement. 23 The defendant moved for summary
judgment, contending that its use of the photo constituted fair use. 24
The district court granted the motion, finding that the defendant's
use of the photograph was "transformative in function and purpose"
because while Brammer's purpose was expressive, the defendant's
purpose was "informational: to provide festival attendees with
information regarding the local area." 2 5
Moreover, the court
concluded, the defendant's use was made in good faith because the
festival's organizer "found the photo online and saw no indication that
it was copyrighted," so he believed that the photograph was free for
public use. 26 The defendant, the court concluded, was using the
photograph "purely for its factual content"-to show festival
attendees "a depiction of the Adams Morgan neighborhood" 27-and
had not harmed the plaintiff s market; the plaintiff had published the
photograph on the internet and had been compensated by others for
its use. 2 8 Thus, the court concluded that the four fair use factors
favored the defendant and granted summary judgment. 29
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this result was swiftly reversed on
appeal. Noting that fair use "presents a mixed question of law and
fact," 30 the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in every
Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014, at

B2.
21.
22.
23.

Brammerv. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id. Brammer also filed suit for removal and alteration of copyright

management information under 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2018); the district court
determined that he later abandoned that claim. Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods.,
LLC, No. 1-17-CV-01009, 2018 WL 2921089, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2018), rev'd,
922 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2019).
24. Brammer, 922 F.3d at 261. The four fair use factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
25. Brammer, 2018 WL 2921089, at *2.
26. Id.

27. Id.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at *3.
Id.
Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2019).
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aspect of its assessment of the four fair use factors, including whether
the defendant's purported good faith should have tipped the balance
in its favor. 3 1 Indeed, rather than simply declaring that summary
judgment was inappropriate and remanding for trial on the fair use
defense, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the defense failed as a
matter of law and remanded the case for further proceedings. 32 (Since
the defendant apparently did not otherwise challenge the claim of
infringement, the Fourth Circuit's opinion would seem to require a
finding of liability on remand, absent settlement.)
The point of these examples is not to offer a judgment on their
merits. Rather, it is to highlight that-as with many questions of
law-it is often difficult to predict how a court will rule on a claim of
copyright infringement, even if the facts are undisputed. This is
especially true for entities removed from the allegedly infringing
acts-the platforms, the venue hosts, the video hosting sites. And yet,
the commonly accepted standard for contributory copyright
infringement provides for liability in terms that suggest factual
certainty: when one "with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another." 33
The concept of knowledge as a touchstone for secondary liability
is not, of course, unique to copyright infringement. Within the realm
of secondary liability for others' speech, we see this same standard
present in liability for defamation. In defamation cases, the issue of
whether a nonpublisher intermediary can be held liable for
facilitating a speaker's defamatory speech (often called "distributor
liability") largely turns on whether the secondarily liable party "knew
or had reason to know" about the unlawful speech at issue. 34 Because
the implication of such a standard is that the defendant did not take
appropriate action upon gaining this knowledge, the standard is akin

31. Id. at 269.
32. Id.
33. Gershwin Publg Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi
Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). As I will discuss later in
this Article, the DMCA's safe harbor for providers also incorporates knowledge
into its assessment of potential liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2018)
(stating that a provider qualifies for a safe harbor from liability only if, inter alia,
the provider "does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing" and "in the absence of
such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent."); infra text accompanying notes 189-213.
34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(" [O]ne who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third
person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its
defamatory character."); see also Matthew Schruers, Note, The History and
Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 231-32
(2002) (describing the different forms of liability).
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to liability based on negligence, as opposed to the strict liability
assigned to publishers.
But despite the importance of the knowledge standard to a
finding of liability for contributory copyright infringement, the case
law has never been clear on what "knowledge" means. Indeed, given
that what the defendant is supposed to "know" is a legal statuswhether the original speaker is engaged in lawful or unlawful
activity-it is arguably impossible for the defendant to acquire such
knowledge before that status has been adjudicated. At best, such a
defendant can make a prediction of the likely outcome of that legal
proceeding.35 In some instances-perhaps file trading of entire
musical works-that prediction asymptotically approaches certainty.
But in other cases, the availability of a fair use or other defense-even
for a use that employs the entire protected work-makes "knowing"
whether the speaker is engaging in lawful or unlawful speech much
less clear. And because a court would determine whether any direct
infringement has occurred before it considered questions of secondary
liability, the risk of hindsight bias means that courts adjudicating
questions of contributory infringement may well deem the legal
status of speech more "knowable" post hoc than it was before.
This is not to say that copyright law is hopelessly
indeterminate-that those engaging in parodies, cultural critiques,
and educational uses, for instance, must withdraw from the public
arena for fear that a future court might conclude that what they are
doing is infringement. Some uses-such as quoting small portions of
a book in a book review-have been so ingrained in our collective
judgment as fair uses that predictions as to a future adjudication of
lawfulness can be said to be virtually certain. 36 This might lead one
to think, as Chief Justice Roberts said in his confirmation hearing,
that what courts are doing is stating whether a pitch is a ball or a
strike 37 -confirming or revealing some state of being that already
exists in the world. But it's important to recognize, as baseball
umpire Bill Klein famously noted in a Holmesian turn, "[I]t ain't

&

35. For discussions of probabilistic knowledge, see generally, for example,
Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1
(2012), and Mark P. McKenna, Probabilistic Knowledge of Third-Party
TrademarkInfringement, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10 (2011).
36. Several scholars have persuasively argued that the fair use doctrine is
more predictable than some have asserted. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical
Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
554-56 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS
CLARK L. REV. 715, 717-19 (2011); Matthew Sag, PredictingFair Use, 73 OHIO
ST. L.J. 47, 51 (2012); Pamela Samuelson, UnbundlingFair Uses, 77 FORDHAML.
REV. 2537, 2588 (2009).
37. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be
Chief Justice of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., J., D.C. Circuit) ("I will
remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.").
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nothing till I call it."38 The copying in Brammer was ultimately not a
fair use, but only because our federal judicial system gives the Fourth
Circuit interpretive authority over the district courts in its regionand because the plaintiff pursued an appeal in the first place. 39
Whether the law calls this predictive ability "knowledge" may
seem like a mere semantic issue. But the word itself is likely doing
some persuasive work because concluding that a party "knew" about
something beforehand suggests a higher level of culpability than
might have existed at the time. Characterizing the requirement
instead as an assessment of whether the defendant made a
reasonable judgment as to the status of the speech better calibrates
the vocabulary to the task at hand. And because these are scenarios
in which the suppression of speech is potentially at stake, it is
important to at least get the concepts right. 40
II. THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE IN CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT

A.

The Concept of Knowledge in Tort Law
Before considering the role of knowledge in copyright
infringement specifically, it might be helpful to consider its role in
tort law more generally. Although the Copyright Act doesn't address
secondary liability directly, 4 1 since copyright infringement is a tort, it
would be natural that tort doctrine's general theories of secondary
liability would also apply to cases of copyright infringement, which
the Supreme Court has confirmed. 42 For example, section 876 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts notes that one is subject to liability for
harm resulting to a third person from another's tort if that person

38. Nick Paumgarten, No Flag on the Play, NEW YORKER (Jan. 20, 2003),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/01/20/no-flag-on-the-play; see also
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 991, 994 (1897)
("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law.").
39. Brammerv. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 269 (4th Cir. 2019).

40. Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber
Copyright Infringement, EnterpriseLiability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO.
L.J. 1833, 1888 (2000) (asserting that because of free speech concerns, "courts
must not impute knowledge to ISPs for purposes of contributory infringement
unless it is quite clear that infringement has occurred").
41. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984)
("The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement

committed by another.").

An alternative interpretation is that the Copyright

Act's provision that the owner of copyright "has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize" certain uses conveys Congress's intent to provide for contributory
infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018) (emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 930 (2005) (noting that doctrines relating to secondary liability for copyright
infringement "emerged from common law principles and are well established in
the law").
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"knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself." 4 3 In order to be liable, one must give substantial assistance
or encouragement to another to aid him in committing tortious

conduct, knowing that the conduct is tortious.44 The causative
relationship between the defendant's actions and the tortfeasor's
actions alone is insufficient, lest liability turn into a manifestation of
the butterfly effect, with no limitation on the scope of liability. (Were
that to occur, providers of electricity, water, and other contributions
to activity could all be held liable for any resulting harm.) This also
means that contributory liability, in general, is not a strict liability
offense. If that were the case, merely providing assistance would be
sufficient for liability. By requiring knowledge in addition to a
contribution, tort doctrine aims to characterize the activity as faultbased-that the defendant, knowing that it was facilitating tortious
activity, did so anyway. 45
Our next task, then, is to unpack what is meant by "knowledge."
The Restatement (Second) defines "reason to know" and "should have
known," but it does not appear to attempt to define the pure state of
"knowledge," 46 although it is the basis for some of its conclusions
regarding the application of primary liability. For example, as to the
basis for holding the author or original publisher liable for a
defamatory statement, the Restatement (Second) states that such
individual "usually knows or can find out whether a statement in a

43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). The
Restatement takes no position on whether this is applicable "when the conduct
of either the actor or the other is free from intent to do harm or negligence but
involves strict liability for the resulting harm." Id. § 876 caveat. The stilldeveloping Restatement (Third) may, of course, provide additional guidance on
these concepts.
44. Id. § 876(b).

45. Dan L. Burk, Toward an Epistemology of ISP Secondary Liability, 24
PHIL. & TECH. 438, 443 (2011) ("Law is often occasioned on the knowledge or other
mental state of those to whom it applies . . . . From a utilitarian standpoint, such
scienter requirements calibrate liability to the actor's ability to acquire,
comprehend, and act upon socially relevant information; from a deontological
standpoint, scienter attempts to calibrate liability to the actor's moral
culpability.").
46. See Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Monco Agency Inc., 719 F. Supp.
1328, 1331-32 (E.D. La. 1989) ("The Court's finding that actual knowledge is
required by the Restatement [for negligent misrepresentation] is buttressed by
the fact that the definition section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
the terms 'reason to know' and 'should know,' thereby indicating that 'know' has
a different definition." (footnote omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1965))), affd sub. nom. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v.
Monco Agency Inc., 911 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990); Webster v. Culbertson, 761
P.2d 1063, 1067 (Ariz. 1988) ("'Reason to know' is not equivalent to 'actual
knowledge."').
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work produced by him is defamatory or capable of a defamatory
import." 47

"Reason to know," per the Restatement (Second), exists when "the
actor has information from which a person of reasonable intelligence
or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer that the fact in
question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct upon
the assumption that such fact exists." 4 8 The Restatement (Second)
goes on to note that the phrase means:
that the actor has knowledge of facts from which a reasonable
man of ordinary intelligence or one of the superior intelligence
of the actor would either infer the existence of the fact in
question or would regard its existence as so highly probable that
his conduct would be predicated upon the assumption that the
fact did exist. 49
Thus, as Kenneth Simons has noted, "reason to know" occupies a space
between negligence and recklessness, on the one hand, and knowledge
on the other: It requires the actor to have actual subjective awareness
of circumstances from which he should infer the fact in question."50
By contrast, a party "should know" a fact if "a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence or of the superior intelligence of
the actor would ascertain the fact in question in the performance of
his duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon the assumption
that such fact exists." 51 For example, in Dunn v. Hovic, 52 the court
found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's admission of an
industry report on acceptable levels of asbestos exposure introduced
for the purpose of demonstrating what the defendant manufacturer
"reasonably should have known had it either conducted its own tests
or been in contact with others in the industry . . . that were testing." 53
Thus, as the Restatement (Second) suggests, the standards
"reason to know" and "should have known" differ in whether a duty
of investigation is required. "Reason to know" "implies no duty of
knowledge on the part of the actor" whereas "should know" "implies
that the actor owes another the duty of ascertaining the fact in
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977). But
see Benjamin Zipursky, Online Defamation, Legal Concepts, and the Good
Samaritan, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 21 n.139 (2016) (discussing the "remarkable
dearth of support for knowledge-based distributor liability," despite Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 581).
48.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).

49. Id. § 12 cmt. a. The comment goes on to note that the phrase carries the
same meaning as in the Restatement of Agency. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)).
50. Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) ofIntentional Torts?, 48 ARiz.
L. REV. 1061, 1095 n.119 (2006).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
52. 1 F.3d 1362 (3d Cir. 1993).
53. Id. at 1370 (alteration in original) (quoting George v. Celotex Corp., 914
F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1990)).
51.
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question." 54 Thus, an actor governed by a "reason to know" standard
is assessed based only on the information the actor had at the time,
while an actor governed by a "should know" or "should have known"
standard is required to pursue the inquiry to some objectively
determined point, at which stage his knowledge is assessed based on
the information thus acquired.5 5 For example, in Torkie-Tork v.
Wyeth, 56 a 2010 case involving a products liability claim for failure to
warn about the risks of a pharmaceutical, the court noted that a
failure to warn claim under Virginia law "rests on a reason to know
standard rather than the broader should have known standard."5 7
Hence, "[t]he only dangers for which [the manufacturer] had a duty
to warn adequately are those dangers which [it] knew or had reason
to know existed based on the science available at the time the product
left [the manufacturer's] hands"; it had no duty to conduct additional
testing beyond that already required by the Food and Drug
Administration. 58
B.

Gershwin Publishing Corporation and Its Progeny

These definitions, however, do not seem to be pertinent to the
standard for contributory copyright infringement, which focuses on
knowledge of a legal status rather than of a factual status. The case
typically cited as establishing the standard for contributory
infringement is Gershwin PublishingCorporationv. ColumbiaArtists
Management, Inc.,5 9 a 1971 case from the Second Circuit.6 0 The

54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
55. See Foremost-McKesson Corp. v. Allied Chem. Co., 680 P.2d 818, 822-23
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that a "should know" standard places a "heavy
burden" on manufacturers to discover products' dangers and provide warnings
compared to the duty borne by those subject to a "knows or has reason to know"
standard); Liebelt v. Bob Penkhus Volvo-Mazda, Inc., 961 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Colo.
App. 1998) (holding that a "should know" standard creates a duty to investigate
and a "reason to know" standard does not); Christians v. Homestake Enters.,
Ltd., 303 N.W.2d 608, 620 (Wis. 1981) (noting that the "key difference" between
the two standards is whether the defendant is charged with "the duty to perform
whatever affirmative action would be taken by a reasonable person" in the
defendant's position to discover the fact in question); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 401 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("The words 'reason to know' do not
impose any duty to ascertain unknown facts .... ); id. § 339 reporter's note 3
(describing change in standard governing duty of liability of landowner toward

children for artificial condition on the land and stating that "'should know'
involves an obligation of reasonable care to investigate the facts, while 'has
reason to know' means that he knows enough to infer that the fact exists, or to
govern his conduct on the assumption that it exists"). But see Marshall v. Ranne,
511 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. 1974) (concluding that there is "no essential
distinction" between a "reason to know" and a "should have known" standard).
56. 757 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. Va. 2010).
57. Id. at 572.
58. Id. at 573.
59. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
60. Id.
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litigation was brought as a test case by the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP") against Columbia
Artists Management, Inc. ("CAMI") to determine whether CAMI
could be held liable for unpaid licensing fees relating to music in
ASCAP's catalog that was performed at local community concerts that
CAMI facilitated. 6 1 CAMI acknowledged that the performing artists
and the local community concert associations could have been held
directly liable for infringement but challenged ASCAP's attempt to
hold CAMI liable. 62 Relying on two earlier cases, the district court
found that CAMI "caused" the copyright infringement by "organizing,
supervising, and controlling" the local associations and that CAMI
"knowingly participated in the infringement." 63 On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed, holding that just as a party can be held
vicariously liable for another's copyright infringement, "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as
a 'contributory' infringer." 64 Accordingly, it held that the district
court properly found CAMI liable as a contributory infringer since
CAMI knew that compositions subject to copyright were being
performed without a license 6 5 and engaged in "pervasive
participation" in setting up the concerts, thus "causing" the
infringement.6 6 (It also held that CAMI "was in a position to police
the infringing conduct of its artists" and "derived substantial
financial benefit from the actions of the primary infringers" and
67
therefore could also be held liable on a theory of vicarious liability.)

61. Gershwin Publg Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 581,
581 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
62. Id. at 581.
63. Id. at 583 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d
304 (2d Cir. 1963); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). The holding in Shapiro rested on a theory of
vicarious liability (holding a department store liable for the infringement of one
of its concessionaires, regardless of knowledge of the infringing activity) and is
now typically cited for that doctrine. See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308. In Screen
Gems, the court noted that the plaintiffs put forward a theory of contributory
liability precisely because the defendants in the case could likely not be held
liable under a theory of vicarious liability. Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 403

("Since infringement constitutes a tort, common law concepts of tort liability are
relevant in fixing the scope of the statutory copyright remedy, and the basic

common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates in or furthers a
tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the prime tort-feasor is applicable
in suits arising under the Copyright Act." (footnote omitted)).
64. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (citing Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 403)
(footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 1161 ("CAMI stipulated that it deliberately made no effort to obtain
copyright clearance for musical compositions included in the programs and
performed at community concerts.").
66. Id. at 1163.

67. Id.
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The Gershwin court rested its holding on the general principles
of tort law described above. It did not, however, clarify the nature of
its reference to knowledge-whether it was limited to actual
knowledge or also encompassed "reason to know" or "should have
known." In Gershwin, the artist management agency defendant was
held to be secondarily liable for infringement because it organized the
community concerts at issue in advance, knew which songs would be
performed, and knew that no licenses had been obtained. 68 Like a
newspaper's decision to publish in the first instance, the management
agency here could have decided whether to engage in these activities
at all, knowing the scope of its own due diligence. The performers
were the ones engaging in direct copyright infringement, but the
agency was involved in facilitating virtually all aspects of the
performance. There was, therefore, no reason for the court to devote
much attention to what facts the defendant knew at the time of the
performances or whether those facts would have given rise to an
understanding that copyright infringement was likely to be taking
place.
But as with the tort doctrine more generally, the Gershwin
court's requirement of both a material contribution and knowledge
conveyed its understanding that contributory copyright infringement
is not a strict liability offense (as compared to direct copyright
infringement, where liability would turn merely on the completion of
the act). 69 If contributory copyright infringement were intended to be
a strict liability offense, merely providing material assistance to an
infringer would be sufficient for liability. The requirement of
knowledge is not simply about ensuring that the act is volitionalotherwise internet platforms could escape liability for contributory
infringement on this ground alone. 70 Rather, the knowledge
requirement connotes, as Alfred Yen has observed, that liability is
fault based.7 1 To the extent the standard is aimed at deterrence,
requiring knowledge in addition to a material contribution conveys
that the putative contributory infringer has an opportunity to
determine whether to continue the contribution or not and thus avoid
(additional) liability.
68.

See id. at 1162-63.

69.

Cf Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95

CALIF.

L. REV.

941, 979 (2007) ("It was well-established, prior to Sony, that copyright
infringement, whether direct or indirect, is a strict liability offense.").
70. BWP Media USA, Inc. v. T & S Software Assocs., Inc., 852 F.3d 436, 440
(5th Cir. 2017) (noting that every circuit to consider the question has concluded
that direct infringement requires volitional conduct); id. at 444 (reaching the
same conclusion), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 236 (2017).
71. Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 184, 216 (2006) ("Liability is a matter of fault because defendants can
escape liability by refusing to provide material contribution to known
infringers-a form of behaving reasonably in light of what they know."); see also
Alfred C. Yen, A FirstAmendment Perspectiveon the Constructionof Third Party
Copyright Liability, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1481, 1494-95 (2009).
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This conclusion is further supported by the Supreme Court's
decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc. 7 2 The
question in the case was whether Sony could be held liable for
contributory copyright infringement for selling video cassette
recorders given that the primary use of the equipment was to make
copies of copyrighted television programming without the
authorization of the copyright owners. 73 The recorder was the means
by which the copying was effected, so whether Sony had provided a
material contribution to infringement was not disputed.
The
question, then, was whether Sony could be said to have had
knowledge of the infringing activity given that the infringement took
place after the sale had concluded. 74 The Court held that Sony could
not be liable simply because it had constructive knowledge of later
infringement-in other words, the knowledge that some of its
customers would inevitably commit infringement at some point in the
future.7 5 Rather, borrowing from patent law's staple article of
commerce doctrine, the Court held that because the recorders were
capable of substantial noninfringing uses-the authorized recording
of programming in some cases and the fair use of time shifting in
others-attributing the requisite knowledge to Sony based merely on
the low statistical probability of some infringing uses would be
inappropriate. 7 6
Put otherwise, if the device at issue had no
substantial noninfringing uses, the likelihood of subsequent
infringing use would be high (or even 100 percent), such that Sony
could be said to "know" the infringing nature of the future uses. Thus,
if the contribution to copyright infringement could be characterized
as the provision of a product, and that product had substantial
noninfringing uses, a defendant would have the requisite knowledge
of infringement only if it knew of the particular unlawful use to which
its customer would be putting the product at the time of the sale.
After the transaction, the provider would either never learn about the
unlawful use or learn about it too late to change the nature of its
contribution to the activity.7 7 As the Fourth Circuit has put it, "the
72.

464 U.S. 417 (1984).

73. Id. at 428.
74.

Id. at 438-39.

75. Id. at 439.
76. See id. at 442, 456.
77. By contrast, as the Ninth Circuit held in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., where the defendant provides a service and so has an ongoing relationship
with the customer, later-acquired knowledge of unlawful activity by the customer
could provide an opportunity for the defendant to cease contributing to that
activity by changing the nature of the ongoing service. A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
While commentators anticipated that the result in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., would depend on whether the Court saw the
defendant provider of peer-to-peer technology as offering a good (software) or a
service (a peer-to-peer network), the Court was able to evade consideration of this
distinction by resting its holding on a conclusion that the defendants had induced
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proper standard requires a defendant to have specific enough
knowledge of infringement that the defendant could do something
about it." 78
It should be noted that courts in copyright cases appear to have
converged on the conclusion that the knowledge requirement is an
objective one, requiring either actual knowledge (or its equivalent,
willful blindness) or "reason to know"; the negligence standard of
"should have known" is not sufficient.7 9 This means that, in general,
parties are not under an obligation to investigate or to monitor in
order to learn of potential infringement. Courts in the Second Circuit
in particular have emphasized that appropriate evidence in assessing
whether an alleged contributory infringer possessed the requisite
knowledge is external to the particular mental state of the defendant
and can include such evidence as "cease-and-desist letters, officer and
employee
statements, promotional materials,
and industry
experience."8 0
C.

Knowledge of What?

This framing of the knowledge requirement does not, however,
directly address what it means to know or have reason to know of the
infringing activity. One option is that the defendant need only have
knowledge of the underlying act that is later deemed to constitute
infringement. For example, a defendant flea market that provides
one of its vendors with the space to construct its booth and facilitates
transactions and knows that the vendor is selling DVDs of popular
films could be liable under such a theory by simply knowing that
DVDs are being sold, regardless of whether the defendant knows
whether those DVDs are lawful or infringing. Alternatively, the
requirement could be that the defendant must have knowledge of the
legal status of the other party's actions. Using the example here, the
defendant flea market must know not only that the vendor is selling
DVDs of popular films but also that those DVDs are infringing (and
not, for example, sales of secondhand DVDs, which would be lawful
infringement through e-mail communications, advertising, and other actions.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005).
See generally Laura A. Heymann, Inducement as Contributory Copyright
Infringement: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 37 INT'L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 31 (2006) (providing detailed analysis of Grokster
and its anticipated effects).
78. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 31112 (4th Cir. 2018).
79. See, e.g., id. at 310; Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 118 (2d
Cir. 2010) ("The knowledge standard is an objective one; contributory
infringement liability is imposed on persons who 'know or have reason to know'
of the direct infringement.") (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020) (other citations
omitted); NCR Corp. v. Korala Assocs. Ltd., 512 F.3d 807, 816 (6th Cir. 2008).
80. Smith v. BarnesandNoble.com, LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 115, 124 (S.D.N.Y.
2015), affd on other grounds, 839 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Capitol
Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d 640, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
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under copyright law's first sale doctrine). Perhaps surprisingly, there
is little doctrinal assistance in answering this question directly.8 1
Some courts have indicated that simply knowing of the defendant's
activity is not enough, but in opinions in which the question was not
squarely presented. 82 The Ninth Circuit suggested in 2011 that the
standard was "know or have reason to know" and suggested in 2013
that the standard was either actual knowledge or willful blindness,
although the discussion was not key to the result in either case. 83
It seems, however, that if the standard is intended to assign fault
based on a conclusion that the defendant provided assistance at a
time when it could have made the opposite decision, in light of the

81. See, e.g., Erickson Productions, Inc. v. Kast, 921 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir.
2019) (describing "[i]nconsistency in our case law on the 'knowledge' element of
contributory liability"). The scholarship has given relatively little attention to
this question, although Paul Goldstein takes the position that the defendant

"need only have known of the direct infringer's activities, and need not have
reached the legal conclusion that these activities infringed a copyrighted work."
See GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.1 n. 1 (2017-2 supp.) ("This rule is dictated by
the more general rule that innocence is no defense to an action for copy-right
infringement."); id. § 8.3.2 (2019-1 supp.) ("This requirement [in section

512(c)(1)(A)'s reference to 'infringing' material] distinguishes section 512(c)'s
knowledge requirement from the more general knowledge requirement of

contributory infringement, where the defendant need only have known of the
direct infringer's activities, and need not have been on notice that the activities

infringed copyright in the work.").
A Westlaw search for cases quoting Goldstein on this point yielded only five
federal opinions. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Comme'ns, Inc., 199 F.
Supp. 3d 958, 978-79 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2016), rev'd on other grounds, 881 F.3d
293 (4th Cir. 2018); Montalvo v. LT's Benjamin Records, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 121,
134 (D.P.R. 2014); Sarvis v. Polyvore, Inc., No. 12-12233-NMG, 2013 WL
4056208, at *8 (D. Mass. Aug., 9, 2013); Elsevier, Ltd. v. Chitika, Inc., 826 F.
Supp. 2d 398, 404 (D. Mass. 2011); Jalbert v. Grautski, 554 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68 (D.
Mass. 2008) ("Although the defendant must have knowledge of the infringing
activity, 'the defendant need only have known of the direct infringer's activities,
and need not have reached the legal conclusion that those activities infringed a
copyrighted work."') (citing GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.1 n. 1 (2005)).
82. Scholz Design Inc. v. Jaffe, 488 F. Supp. 2d 749, 750 (N.D. Ill. 2007)

(finding after a bench trial that there was no evidence that the defendant
customers "had any knowledge that the copyrighted design of the plaintiff was
being infringed by their architect (if indeed it was being infringed). What the

evidence showed, at most, is that defendants knew one of the plaintiffs designs
would be used in the construction of their house. There is no evidence that either
defendant had any reason to suspect that their architect was infringing any
copyright"); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F.

Supp. 252, 262 (D. Neb. 1982) ("The defendants ... had no knowledge, and no
reason to know, of the infringing nature of the ... plans supplied to them by
Belmont.... Therefore, even if [defendants] were considered to have 'materially
contributed' to the infringing conduct of Belmont, such contribution was made
without knowledge of Belmont's infringing activity and cannot be considered a
contributory infringement.").
83. Compare Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 107273 (9th Cir. 2013), with Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc.,
658 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020).
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knowledge it possessed, that knowledge must relate to the lawfulness
of the activity in question. Just as an individual would not be held to
have engaged in aiding and abetting criminal activity simply by
holding a locked lobby door open for someone who turned out to be a
burglar, a contributory infringer should not be deemed to have
abetted infringement without knowledge that what it was abetting
was infringement. If that were the case, there would be no reason to
include a knowledge requirement at all. Indeed, the doctrine of
willful blindness in copyright law-the concept that avoiding learning
about potentially unlawful behavior should be treated as
knowledge-rests on the assumption that the defendant is
deliberately avoiding gaining knowledge of bad behavior. 84
One might argue that this goal is still satisfied by characterizing
the knowledge requirement simply as an awareness of the activity,
which then gives rise to an obligation on the defendant's part to
investigate that activity before providing any material assistance.
But if that were true, the knowledge requirement ultimately becomes
knowledge of the infringing nature of the activity. Let us assume
again our flea market defendant, who provides the same material
assistance to its vendors as previously described. If the defendant is
held liable for contributory infringement on the grounds that it knew
that its vendors were selling DVDs, presumably the deterrence goal
is not to stop flea markets from offering space to all DVD sellers but
to investigate more thoroughly the nature of the goods they are
selling-in other words, to assess the lawfulness of their activity and
provide assistance only to those who are not infringing.
The consideration becomes more extensive (but not entirely
helpful) in discussions of secondary liability for defamation-that is,
liability for distributing material that is ultimately judged to be
defamatory. (These cases would tend to be relevant because they also
involve the balance of liability for tortious activity against the
possibility of suppression of lawful speech.) Here, the Restatement
(Second) notes that, except for radio or television broadcasters, "one
who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a
third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has
reason to know of its defamatory character."8 5
But whether

84. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F. 3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Willful
blindness is knowledge, in copyright law ... as it is in the law generally. One
who, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is involved in shady dealings, takes
steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature
and extent of those dealings is held to have a criminal intent . . . because a
deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is all that the law requires to establish
a guilty state of mind.") (citations omitted).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). The
Restatement (Second) defines "delivers" as referring to the "transfer or possession
of a physical embodiment of the defamatory matter" and defines "transmits" as
including in addition "the conveyance of defamatory words by methods other than
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"defamatory character" means "the character of the material, which
a court later deems to be defamatory" or means "that the material
would likely (or certainly) be deemed defamatory" is not clear from
the context.
If we consider an analogy from the Supreme Court's cases on
obscenity prosecutions, it might seem as if the former is meant. In
Smith v. California,86 for example, the Court held that a city
ordinance making it illegal "for any person to have in his possession
any obscene or indecent writing" in any place of business where books
were sold could not be constitutionally enforced because it imposed
strict liability for distribution of obscene materials.87 Without a
scienter requirement, the threat of enforcement would mean that the
bookseller would sell only those books it had inspected, which "may
tend to work a substantial restriction on the freedom of speech and of
the press."8 8 A different result was obtained, however, in Hamling v.
United States,89 where defendants challenged their federal
convictions for mailing obscene materials on the grounds that the
government failed to show that the defendants knew the materials
were obscene. 90 It was enough, the Court held, that the statute
required that the defendants "knowingly" used the mail, 9 1 which the
Court interpreted as requiring "that the prosecution show that a
defendant had knowledge of the contents of the materials he
distributed, and that he knew the character and nature of the
materials." 92 "To require proof of a defendant's knowledge of the legal
status of the materials," the Court continued, "would permit the
defendant to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not
brushed up on the law." 93 In so holding, the Court quoted from its
previous opinion in United States v. Wurzbach: 94
Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near
each other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may
be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing that
he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the
95
criminal law to make him take the risk.
This language suggests that a defendant would be deemed to have
knowledge if it was aware of the risk that a court would find the

physical delivery, as in the case of a telegraph company putting through a call."

Id. § 581 cmt. b.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

361 U.S. 147 (1959).
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 150.
418 U.S. 87 (1974).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 119, 123 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1972)).
Id. at 123.
Id.
280 U.S. 396 (1930).
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 124 (citing Wurzbach, 280 U.S. at 399.
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material it distributed to be unlawful-in other words, that the
character of the materials was such that a finding of obscenity was
plausible. This suggests not simply an awareness of the underlying
activity but a further awareness of the characteristics of the activity
that could give rise to a conclusion that the activity is wrongful. This
is perhaps not quite the same as knowledge of the legal status of the
activity, but it is closer than the above language might suggest.
But what of the material that one might not have predicted to be
unlawful but was ultimately deemed so-the reverse of the Brammer
district court decision described above? Could such a defendant be
said to have had knowledge (or reason to know) of the character of the
material? The examples from the Restatement (Second) regarding
defamatory material suggest perhaps not, insofar as such material
would not have given rise to any particular suspicions of
unlawfulness. A newsdealer, for example, "is under no duty to
examine the various publications that he offers for sale to ascertain
whether they contain any defamatory items" unless there are "special
circumstances that should warn the dealer that a particular
publication is defamatory." 96 One set of "special circumstances" may
be the overall nature of the publication: "[W]hen a dealer offers for
sale a particular paper or magazine that notoriously persists in
printing scandalous items, the vendor may do so at the risk that any
particular issue may contain defamatory language." 97 The same
holds true for a bookstore or library: if there are "no facts or
circumstances known to him which would suggest to him, as a
reasonable man, that a particular book contains matter which upon
inspection, he would recognize as defamatory," the vendor or lender
is not liable, nor does it have any duty of inspection if the author or
publishing house is reputable. 9 8 But if the author or publisher has a
track record of publishing "notoriously sensational or scandalous
books," the bookstore or library assumes the risk of being held liable
for defamation.9 9 The import of the Restatement (Second)'s examples
is that whether an intermediary would have "reason to know" of a
statement's defamatory character is a question of circumstance; in
other words, it is a fact-specific inquiry. If special circumstances
exist, the defendant must then decide whether to take the risk that a
court will later deem the material to be unlawful.
Some examples from the case law might help to illustrate this
point. In Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes,"10 0 a group of Washington apple
growers brought a defamation claim against the CBS television
network and three CBS local affiliates based on a report on the
newsmagazine show 60 Minutes concerning the use of the carcinogen
96.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 581 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.

97. Id.

98. Id. § 581 cmt. e.

99. Id.
100.

800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992).

1977).
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Alar on apples. 101 In dismissing the claim against the affiliates, the
court found that the affiliates had no obligation to review the
broadcast for defamatory statements during the three-hour period
between receiving the transmission from the network and airing the
show:
With the possible exception of re-run movies, the content of
which is already widely known and/or catalogued, plaintiffs'
construction would force the creation of full time editorial
boards at local stations throughout the country which possess
sufficient knowledge, legal acumen and access to experts to
continually monitor incoming transmissions and exercise onthe-spot discretionary calls or face $75 million dollar lawsuits
at every turn. That is not realistic.

102

In Sandler v. Calcagni,103 the court ruled that a contract printer
that worked with authors to transform submitted PDFs into finished
books could not be held liable for defamation under a theory of
distributor liability based on defamatory material in one of the books
it printed. 1 04 The printer, the court found, lacked actual knowledge
because neither the printer nor any of its employees knew the
contents of the book, nor had any employee "received any information
to make [the company] question the content and factuality of the
manuscript." 10 5 The court also noted that the printer had no duty of
inspection. 106
Finally, tracking the examples in the Restatement (Second) are
Church of Scientology of Minnesota v. Minnesota State Medical
Association Foundation,107 in which the fact that the original author
was the American Medical Association gave rise to no special
circumstances indicating a risk of liability for defamation, 108 and
Spence v. Flynt,109 in which the court noted that a distributor of
Hustler magazine who had been involved in extensive defamation
litigation with the plaintiff "knew that his continued distribution of
the magazine made him vulnerable to the possibility of future legal
responsibility for its content." 110
101.

Id. at 930-31.

102. Id. at 931; cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) (applying cost-benefit analysis to negligence).
103. 565 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D. Me. 2008).
104. Id. at 195-96.
105. Id. at 195.
106. Id. at 195-96.
107. 264 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 1978).
108. Id. at 156 ("The article's original publisher was known to be reputable,
therefore MSMA and its officers had no reason to believe that the article was
false and defamatory.").
109. 647 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Wyo. 1986).
110. See id. at 1274 ("Jackson, Wyoming is a relatively small community in
which news of Gerry Spence, one of its most famous citizens, travels fast. The
dispute between Mr. Spence and Hustler was well-known to Mr. Lynch. This was
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With these cases as our backdrop, we can turn to analyzing
results in copyright infringement cases, which often involve providers
or platforms with no knowledge of special circumstances that would
make a prediction of infringement more likely. Some courts analyzing
knowledge in the contributory infringement context have thus been
more forgiving of defendants. An early case in this regard was the
1995 decision in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc.,1 11 involving the question of whether
an online bulletin board service ("BBS") could be contributorily liable
for infringement committed by its users. 112 Netcom argued that
basing knowledge on the receipt of notice was insufficient given the
difficulty in determining whether the use was fair. 1 1 3 The court
acknowledged that, in some cases, verification of infringement would
be challenging:
Where a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of
infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the
lack of copyright notices on the copies, or the copyright holder's
failure to provide the necessary documentation to show that
there is a likely infringement, the operator's lack of knowledge
will be found reasonable and there will be no liability for
contributory infringement for allowing the continued
distribution of the works on its system. 114
Because, however, Netcom admitted that it conducted no
investigation after having received notice, the court held that
questions remained as to Netcom's knowledge. 115
In a more recent case, CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,1 16 the
district court similarly noted that, absent notice from the copyright
owner, a defendant would have difficulty determining whether
infringement had occurred given the possibility that the use fell
within the scope of a licensing agreement. 117 "In the case of a service
provider," the court concluded, "knowledge giving rise to liability only
exists
when
there
is
no
colorable
claim
of
users'
noninfringement.... [T]he bare claim of infringement by a copyright
holder does not necessarily give rise to knowledge of an
infringement." 118 And, even more recently, the Second Circuit held
simply not a case of an innocent magazine seller unwittingly disseminating
allegedly libelous material.").
111. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
112. Id. at 1367.
113. Netcom had also argued that it was too difficult to determine whether
the allegedly infringed material was covered by a valid registration, id. at 1374,
but since registration is not required for copyrightability under the 1976 Act, this
seems like an easily dismissed argument.

114. Id.
115. Id. at 1374-75.
116.

164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001), affd, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).

117. Id. at 698.
118. Id. at 698, 707 (citing Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374).
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in CapitolRecords, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC11 that the fact that a video-

containing substantially all of a song protected by copyright-that
was posted to a video-sharing platform was viewed by an employee
was not sufficient to establish that the provider had either actual
knowledge or reason to know of infringement. This was in part
because "the service provider's employee cannot be expected to know
how to distinguish, for example, between infringements and parodies
that may qualify as fair use" or to know "how likely or unlikely it may
be that the user who posted the material had authorization to use the
copyrighted music."

120

At least some courts, however, have not been as generous with
respect to possible copyright infringement. Take, for example, the
district court's opinion in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 121
which granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on the question of
contributory infringement. 12 2 The defendant, ReDigi, offered an
online marketplace for secondhand digital music.

12 3

Users who had

purchased music on iTunes or from another ReDigi user could upload
those files to a cloud-based locker. 12 4 Users could then sell the music
file in the locker to another user for ReDigi credit, which could be used
to purchase additional music. 12 5 In an attempt to forestall a finding
of copyright infringement, ReDigi designed the system so that its
scanning software would delete local copies of the files, packet by
packet, on the computer being used as the file was uploaded to
ReDigi's locker. 12 6 Because, however, the transfer of the file to the
locker implicated the owner's reproduction rights (and could not be
saved by resorting to the first sale doctrine, which applies only to the
owner's distribution rights), the district court concluded that this user
activity constituted direct infringement. 127 Having so determined,
the court then considered whether ReDigi was engaging in
contributory and vicarious infringement.
The contributory
infringement analysis required a determination of whether ReDigi
knew or should have known that this user activity constituted
copyright infringement. 128
In determining that it had "little
difficulty" in concluding that ReDigi had the requisite knowledge, the
court highlighted the uncertainty in the law as evidence of knowledge:
Despite the fact that ReDigi boasted on its website that it was
"The Legal Alternative" and insisted "YES, ReDigi is LEGAL,"
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 96-97.
934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), affd, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 659-60.
Id. at 645.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 646.
at 645-46, 650.
at 650, 655-57.
at 658.
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ReDigi warned investors in its subscription agreements that
"the law cannot be said to be well-settled" in this area and that
it could not guarantee ReDigi would prevail on its copyright
defenses.
The Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") sent ReDigi a cease-and-desist letter in November
2011, advising ReDigi that its website violated Capitol's and
other RIAA members' copyrights.
Further, ReDigi was
ensnared in a licensing dispute over song clips and cover art
shortly after its launch, plainly indicating that infringement
could be afoot. ReDigi was also, of course, aware that copyright
protected content was being sold on its website - a fact central
to its business model and promotional campaigns. Finally,
ReDigi's officers claim to have "researched copyright law [and]
consulted with attorneys" concerning their service, and also to
have met with record companies "to get input, get marketing
support[,] and enter into deals with the labels." By educating
themselves, the officers presumably understood the likelihood
that use of ReDigi's service would result in infringement.
Indeed, though ReDigi attempts to use its consultations with
counsel as a shield, it is telling that ReDigi declined to reveal
any of the advice it received on the subject. 129
The question of knowledge was not an issue on appeal; ReDigi
appealed (and lost) only on the questions of first sale and fair use, 130
which may seem to support (with hindsight bias) the district court's
conclusion that knowledge of infringement was obvious. But at the
time, ReDigi did not know that its users would be deemed to be
infringers given the state of the doctrine and its potential application
to new technologies. 131 It should be concerning that acknowledgment
of uncertainty in the doctrine (seeking legal advice and licensing deals
in a case that even the district court acknowledged raised a "novel
question") 132 was treated as clear evidence of knowledge of
infringement at the very time that those activities were being
undertaken.

129. Id. at 658-59 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

But see

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994) ("[W]e reject
Acuff-Rose's argument that 2 Live Crew's request for permission to use the
original should be weighed against a finding of fair use. Even if good faith were
central to fair use, 2 Live Crew's actions do not necessarily suggest that they
believed their version was not fair use; the offer may simply have been made in
a good-faith effort to avoid this litigation.").
130. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 656, 663 (2d Cir.
2018).
131. Compare, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d
121, 137 (2008) (holding that the provision of television programming over the
internet through individual server space on remote DVR system is not an
infringing public performance), with Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431,
449 (2014) (holding that the provision of television programming over the
internet through individual antennas is an infringing public performance (but
not discussing Cartoon Network)).
132. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 648.
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The district court in Cariou v. Prince1 33 , by contrast, found
knowledge based on not seeking legal advice. 134 The case involved the
well-known appropriation artist Richard Prince's use of a number of
photographs created by the plaintiff, Patrick Cariou. 1 35 In addition
to the suit against Prince, Cariou also sued the Gagosian Gallery,
Larry Gagosian, and Rizzoli International Publications. 136 In holding
the Gagosian defendants liable not only for direct infringement but
also for contributory infringement, the district court noted that the
defendants "were well aware of (and capitalized on) Prince's
reputation as an appropriation artist who rejects the constricts of
copyright law, but they never inquired into the propriety of Prince's
use of the photos." 1 37 Accordingly, the court concluded, the Gagosian
defendants knew or should have known that Prince's use of the
photographs was infringing when they promoted his work, despite the
argument that his activity constituted a fair use. 1 38 And, indeed, the
finding of infringement was largely reversed on appeal, with the
Second Circuit holding that Prince's use of twenty-five of the thirty
works at issue was fair use as a matter of law and remanding the case
for reconsideration of the five remaining works. 139
D.

What Is Knowledge?
Here, though, is the question that these varying conclusions
surface: Is it even possible to "know" whether another's activity is
infringing, given that infringement is a legal status that does not
exist until a court pronounces it so? Or is what the courts have
characterized as "knowledge" really an assessment of unlawfulness,
where a determination of fault would depend on how reasonable that
assessment was deemed to be under the circumstances? 14 0 The cases

133. 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),judgment rev'd in part, vacated in
part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
134. Id. at 345-355.
135. Id. at 343-44.
136. See id. at 337. Rizzoli was later voluntarily dismissed from the case. See
Docket Entry 29, Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:08CV-11327).
137. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 354-55.
138. Id. at 355.
139. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706, 712 (2d Cir. 2013). The case settled
in March 2014. Brian Boucher, Landmark Copyright Lawsuit Cariou v. Prince
Is
Settled,
ART
Am.
(Mar.
18,
2014,
6:01
PM),
http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/landmark-copyright
-lawsuit-cariou-v-prince-is -settled/.
140. Daphne Keller has reported that in some jurisdictions, a provider is not
deemed to know that a user's content is unlawful until it is adjudicated as such
by a court, with exceptions for "manifestly" unlawful content. Daphne Keller,
Toward a Clearer Conversation About Platform Liability, Emerging Threats,
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content
/toward-clearer-conversation-about-platform-liability
(citing sources
from
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, and Spain).
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discussed above all suggest that the concept of "knowledge" as used
in contributory infringement doctrine is something of a misnomer.
Knowledge (and its corollary, reason to know) does not describe a
certainty regarding a fact in the world but rather a prediction of a
legal status. (The Restatement (Second) states that both standards
"are used with respect to existent facts.") 141 The standard does not
require the defendant to proactively investigate, but once
circumstances are brought to its attention that suggest some level of
probability that the underlying speech is unlawful, it is then
incumbent on the defendant to make a decision as to whether to
accept the risk that continued material assistance will render it
secondarily liable.
Indeed, it is questionable whether the fact that something is
infringing can even be known at all ex ante. An instance of speech
cannot be inherently infringing in the same way that a car can be red;
infringing speech takes on that characteristic as a legal matter only
after a judicial body has determined it to have that characteristic.
The fact that a car is red depends on shared and received
understandings, but it is unlikely to be debated or to depend on the
result of a future determination. In other words, we know to use the
word "red" to describe the color of a particular car because we have
been taught that a particular color perception should be described
using the word "red." Assuming no issues of color perception, once
that visual transmission has been made, we can say that we know
that fact (the color of the car) because it can be perceived without the
need to rely on information from another source. But this is not true
of the status of infringement. A song that is substantially similar to
another song may well be determined not to be infringing based on
the conclusion that the creator did not have access to the original (and
therefore did not copy it) 142 or the conclusion that the defendant was
engaging in fair use. Brammer, as noted above, is an example of how
the status of a particular use is only as determinable as the most
recent court to have opined on it.
Unfortunately, we use the concepts of "knowledge" and "fact"
both to describe things that fall into the "my car is red" category and
to describe things that fall into the "this speech is infringing"
category, 143 despite the fact that the latter conclusion is more legal
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(emphasis added).
142. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)
([I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others
might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's.").
143. Brian Leiter, Law and Objectivity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 969, 975 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro

eds. 2002) ("Most philosophers who deny the metaphysical objectivity of morality
claim that its semantic is non-cognitive: rather than stating facts (that either
obtain or do not obtain), ethical statements, according to non-cognitivism, express
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than factual. (The deceptively simple verb "is" to connect the tworather than "is likely to be adjudicated as" or some other variantalso elides this distinction.) And although it is true that, in a highly
metaphysical sense, we might say that a car isn't red ex ante-it only
becomes red once there is someone to perceive it as such (the age-old
question involving the sound of a tree falling alone in the forest)-the
problem is even more acute with the types of determinations at issue
here. The very nature of the determination-whether speech is
infringing-is such that the speech does not take on that
characteristic until a judicial body declares it to be such. Before any
such judicial determination, then, any "knowledge" of that speech's
legal status on the part of an intermediary is nothing more than a
prediction of what a judicial body is likely to conclude.
This view is supported by looking to epistemological scholarship.
Central to the shift in the view of what constitutes knowledge is a
1963 article by Edmund Gettier titled Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge? 144 In the article, Gettier rejected prior attempts to state
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge based on the claim
that knowledge consists of a justified belief in a true proposition. 145
In other words, Gettier argued, if an individual has justifiable
grounds for believing a proposition that turns out to be true, but on
different grounds, that individual cannot be said to have known the
proposition. So, for example, Gettier posited that Smith believes that
"Jones owns a Ford" and has "strong evidence" for this proposition
and that Smith "has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he
is totally ignorant." 146 Taking then, the proposition that "[e]ither
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" (choosing Barcelona at
random), Smith would say that the proposition is true based on his
belief that Jones owns a Ford. 14 7 Gettier then asked us to suppose
that Jones actually does not own a Ford, but, as it turns out, Brown
is in Barcelona. 14 8 Even though Smith's belief that the proposition is
true was correct, it was not correct for the reason Smith believes it is,
and so Smith cannot be said to have known the proposition. 149
Michael Clark, writing shortly after the publication of Gettier's
article, augmented Gettier's theory by proposing that for an
attitudes or feelings of various kinds. Non-cognitivists bear the burden, then, of
explaining away the surface grammar and logical structure of ethical discourse
which make it indistinguishable from ordinary empirical discourse (compare:
'This distribution is unjust,' with 'That chair is red')." (citation omitted)).
144. Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121
(1963).
145. Id.; see, e.g., A.J. AYER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 34 (1956) ("I
conclude then that the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that
something is the case are first that what one is said to know be true, secondly
that one be sure of it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure.").
146. Gettier, supra note 144, at 122.
147. Id. at 122-23.
148. Id. at 123.
149. Id.
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individual to truly know a proposition, his belief that the proposition
is true must be "fully grounded"-meaning that the individual must
have justifiable grounds for relying on the particular evidence at
hand. 150 To revisit Gettier's example from above, it would not be
enough, according to Clark, that Smith has "strong evidence" that
Jones owns a Ford; we would need to ask why Smith believes that
proposition and whether those grounds are justifiably relied upon. 151
(For example, Smith might say that his belief was based on a report
from Brown, who has always proved to be reliable in the past, even if
he was incorrect in this instance.) 152 Alvin Goldman was similarly
aligned in his approach to the issue, characterizing knowledge as
requiring a causal connection between what makes a proposition true
and why the individual believes it to be true. 153 Furthermore,
Goldman argued, the supporting inferences leading an individual to
believe something to be true must be warranted-in other words, they
must "confirm [the proposition] very highly, whether deductively or
inductively," as opposed to merely being "lucky guesses." 154
Isaac Levi, by contrast, took issue with the focus on justification,
instead arguing from a pragmatic perspective. It is not important,
Levi contended, how an individual acquires knowledge; our focus
should be on how that individual maintains knowledge and avoids
introduction of subsequent error. 155 Thus, there is no distinction
between believing a proposition to be true and knowing it to be true:
From X's point of view at t, there is no difference between what
he fully believes at t and what he knows at t. From his point of
view at t, if he fully believes h at t, the falsity of h is not a serious
possibility for him at t. Hence, according to X, h is true. There
is no need for justification. How could there be, given that the
falsity of h is not a serious possibility? Only if one insists that
in order to claim knowledge that h, X must also show that he
admitted h into his corpus legitimately, could an opening be
made for a distinction between knowing that h and his believing
that h. But it is precisely this sort of pedigree epistemology that
I mean to reject. 156
To some extent, Levi's relativistic view of knowledge is embedded
in the very way that we let juries decide cases. When a jury concludes,
in a civil matter, that an event is more likely than not to have
occurred or, in a criminal matter, that an event occurred beyond a
150. Michael Clark, Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's
Paper, 24 ANALYSIS 46, 47 (1963).
151. Id.

152.

See id. at 46-47.

153.
154.
155.

Alvin Goldman, A CausalTheory of Knowing, 64 J. PHIL. 357, 358 (1967).
Id. at 363.

156.

Id.

ISAAC LEVI, THE ENTERPRISE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY ON KNOWLEDGE,
CREDAL PROBABILITY, AND CHANCE 28 (1980).
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reasonable doubt, we cannot say that the event occurred as a matter
of epistemological certainty. Witnesses might be lying, key evidence
might not have been presented, and individual jurors might be
employing erratic reasoning processes. Indeed, the ability of some
criminal defendants to have their convictions reversed based on DNA
or other newly discovered or analyzed evidence tells us that a jury's
conclusion as to what happened in any case is not "fact" but rather is
a particular legal kind of fact: facts that we accept as true for purposes
of the case before us at the time. When a jury concludes that a
defendant was at the crime scene because it disbelieves his alibi and
believes other witnesses, the defendant was, for all legal purposes, at
the crime scene, even if this is not actually true.1 57
This is perhaps even more true when we consider the juridical
"fact" of whether an action is lawful or unlawful. Whether a
particular physical touching of another is "harmful or offensive" (and
thus constitutes a battery), for example, is a determination that is
stated in fact-like language but is actually a legal determination of
what the particular decision maker at the time believes has met that
standard.158 And that conclusion-given that it is a question of
"fact"-can differ from court to court and over time as well. What may
be harmful or offensive to one jury may not be so to another. 159
157. See Joseph W. Little, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 45 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 715, 718 (2001) ("In a sense, the jury's fact-finding role mirrors that of those
football officials who review television tapes of the play to make an instant replay
decision. The actual'truth' of the replay depends upon camera angles, television
lens' fidelity, the presence of occluding bodies between the lens and the play and
similar factors. By contrast, the fidelity of a jury's 'instant replay' decisions as
measured by 'truth as God knows it' is a function of the amount and quality of
the evidence submitted to it, the skill of the lawyers and the capabilities of the
jurors. When parties dispute historical facts (such as What happened?, When?,
Where? By whose acts? and Why?) juries must provide the answers (often
embodied in verdicts). These 'findings of fact' become the legal version of the
historical truth and they determine who wins and who loses the cases.").
158. See, e.g., White v. Univ. of Idaho, 768 P.2d 827, 828 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)
(" [A] person may commit a battery when intending only a joke, or a complimentwhere an unappreciated kiss is bestowed without consent, or a misguided effort
is made to render assistance.").
159. MICHAEL P. LYNCH, TRUE TO LIFE: WHY TRUTH MATTERS 44 (2004)
("Whether it is legal to buy alcohol, or carry a handgun, depends on where you
are. As a result, while legal truth is objective in that we can make mistakes about
what does or doesn't fit with the body of law, it is also relative-whether an action
is legal or not depends on the system of law in question. In this sense, the
pluralist intuition behind relativism I noted earlier seems apt with regard to the
law: there can be more than one true description of "legal reality-of what
actions are legal and what are not."); see also, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND
TRUTH 5-6 (1996) (describing the key difference between the realist position and
the anti-realist position as being that the former claims that a "truth" exists
outside of our ability to recognize it (i.e., an objectivist position), while the antirealist claims that "truth" is only what we agree on); Mirjan Damaska, Truth in
Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289, 300 (1998) ("[S]ome facts seem easily
severable from value judgments, or the application of legal norms: for example,
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This is particularly true of "factual" determinations that have a
purely legal or social origin. Whether a physical touching is "harmful"
or "offensive" is a way of assigning a legal label to a characteristic
that has a physical resonance; the harm of such a touching is felt by
the plaintiff, and the label is a way of encouraging jurors to think
about the harm at issue. With speech that is "infringing," the harm
of the speech is purely that created by the law-infringing speech is
harmful not because of the feelings it engenders but because society
has determined that authors should have certain legal rights and that
infringing speech violates those rights. 160
This is not, therefore, what Alvin Goldman has characterized as
a "veriphobic" view of the world in which the concepts of truth and
falsity have no meaning whatsoever-a relativistic view that holds
that knowledge is simply a matter of "institutionalized belief' or
"social doxology." 161 Rather, this is the recognition that a legal
characteristic is not the same thing as a natural fact and that our
current secondary liability doctrine is unclear about what it expects
of intermediaries in this regard. It is inapt, therefore, to say that a
party had knowledge about something that did not, in fact, exist at
the time (a declaration of infringement), even if one could have
predicted that result. In at least some instances-Aereo and
Brammer are but two examples-educated observers could differ in
their judgment. It is therefore inappropriate to say that such
judgment constituted knowledge. 1 62

was a certain chemical present in the deceased's blood? Other facts, however,
consist of complex social evaluations: for example, was a situation dangerous, or
is a picture sexually explicit? ... Establishing that somebody died is much less
dependent on changing social views than establishing that he was engaged in
provocative or life-threatening behavior at the time of his death. A stronger
conception of objectivity can thus be applied in the former than in the latter
case.").
160. Compare, for example, Dennis Patterson's description of the legal term
"negotiable instrument":
Like the vast majority of general legal terms, "negotiable instrument"
is an artifact, a creature of convention. The meaning of "negotiable
instrument" is not "given by the way the world is"; there is no "real
nature" of a negotiable instrument. We do not "discover" the meaning
of "negotiable instrument" by discerning objects in the world having
rigidly designated natural properties. It is only in and through the
institutional conventions of commerce that "negotiable instrument" has
its meaning. To know the meaning of this general legal term, one must
consult the conventions for its use, for it is solely against that
background that participants in legal discourse frame interpretive
arguments. Those arguments are shaped through and through by
institutional conventions that are constitutive of law.
PATTERSON, supra note 159, at 54 (footnotes omitted).
161. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 7 (1999).
162.

Cf DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 201 (2011) ("What is

perverse about the use of know in [such a] context is not that some individuals
get credit for prescience that they do not deserve. It is that the language implies
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The concept of "knowledge" is particularly problematic in the
context of contributory infringement because the underlying facts
that go into a determination of infringement often depend on facts
related to (and often known only to) the copyright owner: that she is
the owner of the work, that she did not authorize its use, and so forth.
This phenomenon is not always troubling; as Alvin Goldman notes,
we often rely on the testimony of unfamiliar reporters as we make
decisions in our daily lives:
If you arrive at an airport and the public address system
announces a one-hour delay of your flight, you will typically
assign a high probability to that statement (or the statement
that it is delayed by at least one hour). But you have no
knowledge whatever of the speaker's individual characteristics.
(Here the speaker is delivering a report second hand; but I allow
that to pass in this context.) Have you made an unreasonable
probability estimate, indefensible by Bayesian standards? Not
necessarily. First, you have background information about the
sorts of flight information available to personnel using the
public address system. Second, you have some idea of how
employees are likely to be chastised or disciplined for serious
errors. Third, you have general information, partly derived
from knowledge of "folk psychology," about how individuals will
typically respond to their job's incentive systems. . . . Thus,
hearers may be positioned to make reasonably accurate
likelihood estimates without knowing anything distinctive
about the specific reporter, just by knowing the circumstances
of her employment. 163
Central to the persuasiveness of Goldman's point, however, is our
willingness to treat that voice as expert for the proposition it stateswe assume, in other words, that the voice we hear over the public
address system is both someone authorized to make such
announcements (and not, say, an interloper who has taken control of
the microphone) and someone who has sufficient incentives to
announce correct information. 1 64 This is not, however, as likely to be
true in the situations at issue here. One might argue that certain
owner characteristics might lead an intermediary to credit
information more robustly-the fact that a report is coming from a
large, respected corporation rather than from an unknown individual,
for example. But, as experience has demonstrated, even such actors

that the world is more knowable than it is. It helps perpetuate a pernicious
illusion.").
163. GOLDMAN, supra note 161, at 125.
164. Cf C.A.J. Coady, Testimony and Observation, 10 AM. PHIL. Q. 149, 15152 (1973) (noting that verifying the reliability of experts often requires either
reliance on the reports of others, which raises the same issue, or investigating
the accuracy of past statements, which obviates the need for the expert).
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have little incentive to understate their legal claims. 165 In Reno v.
ACLU, 166 for example, in which the Supreme Court largely
invalidated the Communication Decency Act ("CDA")'s attempt to
regulate indecent speech on the internet, the Court rejected the
government's assertion that the "knowledge" requirement of 47
U.S.C. § 223(a) and (d) saved the CDA from overbreadth because it
ensured that only speech to minors was at issue and not speech
communicated to adults. 167 Given the way in which such "knowledge"
would be obtained, the Court noted, the statute "would confer broad
powers of censorship, in the form of a 'heckler's veto,' upon any
opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on and inform the
would-be

discoursers

that

his

17-year-old

child .

.

. would

be

present." 168
This consideration of whether it is possible to "know" a future
legal conclusion highlights that the knowledge requirement refers, at
best, to having a "reason to know," so long as we give "know" a
nonintuitive meaning. One cannot have actual knowledge of a
prediction-as any reputable lawyer will say when she gives advice,
no legal outcome is a certainty. And one can only have "reason to
know" that infringement has taken or will take place if we interpret
this phrase as meaning "reason to predict that a court shall so
conclude" from an objective perspective. The fact that contributory
infringement can also be based on inducing another to infringe and
yet still require knowledge-the standard is "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another" 169-highlights that
knowledge is inherently a predictive exercise. One cannot induce a
past act of infringement, so any "knowledge" that accompanies
inducement must mean an expectation that the other party will follow
through on what appears to be infringement. 17 0

165. See, for example, the letters posted at the website LUMEN,
https://www.lumendatabase.org/, formerly known as Chilling Effects. See also
JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

42-43 (2011) (detailing overreaching copyright claims by creators and content
producers).
166. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
167. Id. at 849, 880.
168. Id. at 880.
169. Gershwin Publ'g. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi
Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 327 F. Supp. 788
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Screen Gems-Columbia Music,
Inc. v. Metlis & Lebow Corp., 453 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1972)).
170. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 69, at 1017 (noting that the plaintiffs
in Sony would not likely have succeeded on an inducement theory because that
theory would have "required Sony to know or have reason to know that home
taping was illegal. Given the uncertainty surrounding the contours of fair use, it
seems doubtful that this element could have been established.").
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III. NOTICE AND KNOWLEDGE

Unfortunately, courts compound the fuzziness around what
knowledge really means in this context in their discussion of noticespecifically, their conclusions that the notice sent by the copyright
owner either provided the defendant with actual knowledge of
infringement or provided the defendant with reason to know of
infringement.
This distinction was not apparent in Gershwin given the
defendant's thoroughgoing engagement with the community concerts
at issue in the case. The defendant obtained all the information
relevant to its decision to go forward from its own activities and
discussions with the local concert organizers; it was not trying to
evaluate the use of a copyrighted work that was entirely unfamiliar
to it. The more difficult cases are ones in which the secondarily liable
party isn't an active participant in the infringement ex ante in the
Gershwin sense but instead provides the facilities for infringement on
an ongoing basis and is thus put in the position of constantly having
to make decisions as to individual acts of alleged infringement that
have already occurred. In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 171
involving the provision of swap meet facilities, the court departed
broadly from the concept of knowledge on which the holding in
Gershwin is predicated. Here, the court found that the plaintiff
adequately alleged knowledge not as a result of Cherry Auction's
awareness of its own investigatory efforts (or lack thereof) but as a
result purely of notice: a visit by and letter from the sheriffs
department and an investigatory visit by the plaintiff. 172 The court
did not evaluate the nature of the notice, whether the notice would
have led to the conclusion that the material being distributed was
unlawful, or the basis for its conclusion that the material at issue was
infringing. All of that was assumed, resulting in the conclusion that
notice equaled knowledge. 17 3

171. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
172. Id. at 261 ("There is also no dispute for purposes of this appeal that
Cherry Auction and its operators were aware that vendors in their swap meet
were selling counterfeit recordings in violation of Fonovisa's trademarks and
copyrights. Indeed, it is alleged that in 1991, the Fresno County Sheriffs
Department raided the Cherry Action swap meet and seized more than 38,000
counterfeit recordings. The following year, after finding that vendors at the
Cherry Auction swap meet were still selling counterfeit recordings, the Sheriff
sent a letter notifying Cherry Auction of the on-going sales of infringing
materials, and reminding Cherry Auction that they had agreed to provide the
Sheriff with identifying information from each vendor. In addition, in 1993,
Fonovisa itself sent an investigator to the Cherry Auction site and observed sales
of counterfeit recordings.").
173. See id. at 264. The in-person visit by law enforcement is simply the
written notice in a stronger form.
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In both A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 174 and MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,175 the Ninth Circuit
assumed the expansive definition of knowledge that Fonovisa
provided, in which knowledge and notice are essentially equivalent,
and the only issue is the timing of that knowledge. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that Napster had actual knowledge of the infringing
conduct as a result of notices from the RIAA of infringing material
being traded using the Napster search index and that Napster's
continued participation in that infringement-in other words, its
failure to remove those song titles from the index in response to the
notices-was a knowing, material contribution to any future acts of
infringement of that material.17 6 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit
concluded in Grokster that whatever knowledge Grokster might
eventually have obtained through the RIAA's notices came too latein other words, after it had already provided the material contribution
(the distribution of the technology). 177 But neither case questioned
whether the notice was, by itself, sufficient to provide "knowledge of
the infringing activity." And because many intermediaries distribute
speech online with some degree of permanence-websites, message
boards, online forums, and so forth-the timing question is not likely
to be an issue. As in Fonovisa, the notice will come at a time when
the provider can do something about the accused infringement (i.e.,
take it down or leave it up), and so the issue of whether notice equals
knowledge is highly relevant.
Indeed, courts often elide this consideration by concluding that
notice provided by an agent of the copyright holder also provides the
requisite knowledge-in other words, being informed by a third party
that a customer or vendor is engaging in copyright infringement is
equivalent to knowing that infringement is taking place. For
example, in UMG Recordings v. Sinnott, 178 the court concluded that
it was "clear" that the defendant had both actual and constructive
knowledge of his vendors' sales of infringing CDs and cassettes
because RIAA investigators "identified themselves to Sinnott, and
explained that three MFM vendors were selling infringing CDs or
cassettes, requested his assistance in putting a stop to the infringing
activity, explained Sinnott's potential liability, and offered to train
Sinnott and his staff to recognize infringing sound recordings." 179
Because the defendant did not contest that he received and
understood this message, the court found that he possessed
knowledge of the claimed infringement. 180 The court in Monotype
174. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
175. 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
176. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004, 1020 n.5.
177. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162. The Supreme Court's decision in the case
was based on a theory of inducement. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37, 941.
178. 300 F. Supp. 2d 993 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
179. Id. at 999.
180. Id.
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Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 1 81 to take another example,
characterized the doctrine thus: "The knowledge element for
contributory copyright infringement is met in those cases where a
party has been notified of specific infringing uses of its technology and
fails to act to prevent future such infringing uses, or willfully blinds
itself to such infringing uses." 182
By contrast, in CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 183 in which
the plaintiff brought suit against the operator of a real estate website
where agents had posted the plaintiffs photographs without
authorization, the court was less sanguine about the effect of notice,
writing that "the bare claim of infringement by a copyright holder
does not necessarily give rise to knowledge of an infringement." 184
And Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 185 a
contributory trademark infringement case, offers the following:
The mere assertion by a trademark owner that a domain name
infringes its mark is not sufficient to impute knowledge of
infringement to NSI. . . . In holding that the degree of
uncertainty over infringing uses of domain names makes it
inappropriate to impose contributory liability on NSI, the Court
is not making new trademark rules for the Internet.
Contributory infringement doctrine has always treated
uncertainty of infringement as relevant to the question of an
alleged contributory infringer's knowledge.
A trademark
owner's demand letter is insufficient to resolve this inherent

uncertainty.

186

181. 376 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
182. Id. at 886; see also Century Consultants, Ltd. v. Miller Grp., Inc., No. 033105, 2008 WL 345541, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2008) (finding knowledge
established through contract that required defendant to create a program that
would incorporate plaintiffs works).
183. 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001).
184. Id. at 691-92, 707 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
185. 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
186. Id. at 963-64 (citations omitted). But see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n. 19 (1984) ("We have consistently rejected
the proposition that a similar kinship exists between copyright law and
trademark law, and in the process of doing so have recognized the basic
similarities between copyrights and patents."); Mark Bartholomew, Copyright,
Trademark and Secondary Liability After Grokster, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 445,
454-56 (2009) (contrasting knowledge requirements under copyright law and
trademark law).
One commentator has also elided this distinction in defamation cases. DANIEL J.
SOLOVE,

THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE

INTERNET 152, 230 n.97 (2007) ("When the statement was first posted, AOL would
clearly not be liable. But after Zeran told AOL that it was false and begged them
to take it down, then AOL had reason to know it was defamatory." (discussing
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997))).
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Indeed, as Dan Burk has suggested, invoking the epistemological
literature, the simple receipt of a notice cannot be said to be
"knowledge" of the information it contains; at the very least, to say
that one knows something is to convey that one believes that she
knows it, which requires some level of reflection on the truthfulness
of the information. 187
This is not to say, however, that a defendant might not be
justified in relying on a notice from a copyright owner to make a
prediction about the likelihood of a court's conclusion that the activity
claimed as infringement is indeed infringing. Some such defendants
will not be trained in copyright law or will not have the time or
resources to acquire additional information or advice to assist in their
evaluation of the claim and might reasonably conclude that the notice
is reliable. But to call this decision-making process "knowledge"
mischaracterizes what is happening and, as I will discuss, has the
potential to distort a court's evaluation of the defendant's conduct. 188
It is, of course, true that even the "reason to predict" conception
of knowledge has very little relevance to a good deal of online activity.
Such a standard might work for defendants similar to those in
Gershwin and Fonovisa, where the number of claims to consider is
relatively small and the risk to protected speech minimal. An online
service provider or platform, by contrast, has significant resource
constraints on its ability to make any predictions about claimed
infringement; for such providers, referring to knowledge in any form
is highly misdescriptive.
The DMCA acknowledges this only partially.
Section 512
provides, in pertinent part, that a service provider shall not be liable
for damages for copyright infringement committed on its service by
its users so long as the provider "does not have actual knowledge" that
the material is infringing; the provider, in the absence of actual
knowledge, "is not aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent"; and the provider, upon obtaining
such knowledge or awareness, "acts expeditiously to remove, or

187. Burk, supra note 45, at 443 ("Knowledge and information are typically
distinguished in epistemological discussions; often information is regarded as
prerequisite to knowledge, but the latter is viewed as requiring some additional
degree of cognition, application, contemplation, or awareness beyond the simple
provision of information. . . . Statutory provisions that involve 'knowledge' or
acting 'knowingly' as the legal requirements for mental state generally
contemplate not merely possession of information, but awareness or appreciation
of the information.").
188. At least one court has recognized this distinction. See LoopNet, 164 F.
Supp. 2d at 707 (noting that notice provided under the DMCA gives a provider
the option of responding via the takedown process of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) or
"refus[ing] to remove the allegedly infringing material and expos[ing] itself to the
choppier waters of contributory infringement liability," but that the notice does
not "automatically equate to knowledge for the purpose of assessing liability"),
aff'd, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
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disable access to, the material." 189 It further provides that the safe
harbor from liability shall apply so long as, upon receipt of a
qualifying notice of claimed infringement, the provider "responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing." 190 The first of these provisions appears to
simply enact secondary liability doctrine more generally in its
reference both to "actual knowledge" and to "facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent" (put otherwise, "reason to
know"). For this reason, to the extent this provision provides a safe
harbor at all, it seems to be only with respect to direct infringement
for publicly displaying, performing, or distributing infringing
material.
The statute's reference to "facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent" implements what the legislative
history refers to as a "red flag" test-"information of any kind that a
reasonable person would rely upon," including a notice.1 91 In other
words, a service provider is not required to proactively monitor its
service for evidence of infringing activity, but "if the service provider
becomes aware of a 'red flag' from which infringing activity is
apparent, it will lose the limitation of liability if it takes no action." 192
Consistent with a "reason to know" standard, the congressional report
further notes that this part of the test is objective-what would have
been apparent to "a reasonable person operating under the same or
similar circumstances." 193 In other words, as the Second Circuit
noted in CapitalRecords, LLC v. Vimeo, Inc., 194 "the actual knowledge
provision turns on whether the provider actually or 'subjectively'
knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on
whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have
made the specific infringement 'objectively' obvious to a reasonable
person." 195 This provision therefore codifies to some extent the idea
189.

17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1)(A) (2018).

&

190. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
191. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 25 (1998); H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2,
at 53 (1998) (describing facts or circumstances that constitute a "red flag" as
when infringing activity "would have been apparent to a reasonable person
operating under the same or similar circumstances"); S. REP. No. 105-190 (1998).
The first part of the House report (from the Judiciary Committee) incorrectly
states that this standard "differs from existing law, under which a defendant may
be liable for contributory infringement, if it knows or should have known that
material was infringing." H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 25; see also 6 PATRY
ON COPYRIGHT § 21:85 (2020) (characterizing the Judiciary Committee report as
unreliable); Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L.
ARTs 233, 252 (2009) (noting that "Congress intended to establish a high standard
of knowledge," under which "[i]t is not enough that facts suggest potential or
possible infringement, or that facts might raise a suspicion of infringement").
192. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53.
193. Id.
194. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2016).
195. Id. (quoting Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir.
2012)).
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that a provider can "know" that infringement has occurred, although
it couches it in predictive language. In this regard, it is important to
note that the "reasonable person" is "an ordinary person-not
endowed with specialized knowledge or expertise concerning . . . the
laws of copyright." 196 Thus, the Second Circuit held in Vimeo that
evidence that an employee of a video-hosting platform had seen a
video posted by a user that included all or substantially all of a song
protected by copyright, which the plaintiff alleged was "recognizable,"
was not sufficient "to make infringement obvious to an ordinary
reasonable person, who is not an expert in music or the law of

copyright."

197

The third provision, typically referred to as "notice and
takedown," is where much activity takes place. As noted, the DMCA
provides that upon receipt of a qualifying notice, the provider can take
advantage of immunity from liability if it takes down the material
identified in the notice. 198 The provider must then notify the user,
who has the opportunity to file a counter-notice challenging the basis
for the removal. 199 If the user files a counter-notice, the provider must
replace the material no earlier than ten and no later than fourteen
days later, unless the copyright owner initiates an action in court
against the user. 200 (The fact that reposting of the material is delayed
for ten days upon receipt of the counter-notice was part of the basis
for Senator McCain's counsel's concern.) 20 1
Because this procedure appears in the same part of the statute
as the reference to actual knowledge, some courts and commentators
have described the DMCA's provisions as establishing a "notice
equals knowledge" scenario; 202 the idea is that the notice provided by
the copyright owner establishes knowledge on the part of the service
provider, who must then remove the material or fall victim to the
earlier part of the statute. But this isn't quite accurate. To begin
with, section 512 provides a safe harbor from liability; failure to
qualify for the safe harbor simply means that liability is analyzed
under traditional secondary liability doctrines. If receipt of a notice
196. Id. at 94.
197.

Id.

198.

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2018).

199. Id. § 512(g)(2).
200. Id.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
202. See, e.g., CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 702 (D.
Md. 2001) (characterizing a DMCA notice as one of "three types of knowledge of
infringement that can take a service provider out of the safe harbor"); Lee, supra
note 191, at 252; Yen, supra note 40, at 1884; Emily Zarins, Note, Notice Versus

Knowledge Under the DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct's Safe Harbors, 92

CALIF.

L. REV. 257, 260 (2004) ("Courts have used section 512 notifications from a
copyright owner to the service provider to establish prematurely the knowledge
element of contributory copyright infringement."); id. at 261 (proposing to refer
to a section 512 notice as a "notice of claim" as opposed to a "notice of actual
infringement").
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equaled knowledge, liability under contributory infringement
doctrine (absent the safe harbor) would be virtually unavoidable.
In addition, in providing a safe harbor, section 512 distinguishes
between a service provider that has actual knowledge of infringement
(or reason to know of infringement) and expeditiously removes or
disables access to the material in question and a service provider that
expeditiously removes or disables access to material in response to a
qualifying notice of claimed infringement. 2 03 This latter provision is
simply a "notice equals notice" scenario, in which the statute creates
powerful incentives to remove material upon notice, regardless of
whether the provider would have concluded that the claimed
infringement is likely to be found infringing by a court. 204 Courts are
therefore speaking imprecisely when they equate defective notices
with lack of knowledge-in other words, when they conclude that a
notice that fails to comply with the DMCA's statutory requirements

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A), (C); see also Zarins, supra note 202, at 275.
204. Mark A. Lemley, RationalizingInternet Safe Harbors,6 J. TELECOMM.
HIGH TECH. L. 101, 115 (2007) ("Notice and takedown therefore rewards
overzealous copyright owners who use the DMCA mechanism to rid the Web even
of legitimate content, secure in the expectation that ISPs will take everything
down rather than risk their eligibility for the safe harbor."). Additional support
for this interpretation comes from 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1), which provides a safe
harbor from liability for good faith removal of material "claimed to be infringing
or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,
regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be
infringing," so long as the provider complies with the statute's provisions
regarding notice to the user and any counter notice that is submitted.
The Fourth Circuit has pointed to this language to reject the argument that
section 512(i)(1)(A)'s requirement that providers have a policy for termination of
"repeat infringers" refers only to those users who have been adjudicated to be
infringers. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc., 881 F.3d
293, 302 (4th Cir. 2018). David Nimmer takes a more nuanced view. David
Nimmer, Repeat Infringers, 52 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 167, 184 (2005) (noting
that an infringer in subsection 512(i) is either someone who has been found by a
court to have infringed or someone "about whom the service provider has actual
knowledge that s/he has engaged in infringement," but not someone who is
merely the subject of a notice or someone who has apparently infringed, "given
that appearances may turn out to be deceptive at the end of the day"); see also
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without RestrictingInnovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1421 (2004) (proposing an
administrative procedure to determine repeat infringers so as to achieve a middle
ground between being deemed an infringer merely upon receipt of a claim and
full legal adjudication).
By contrast, section 230 of the CDA which provides a safe harbor for service
providers for much third-party content, does not condition immunity on lack of
knowledge. See 47 U.S.C. §230. Aprovider can receive notice of material claimed
to be defamatory, for example, and can choose whether to remove that material
or to keep it up; even if the material is ultimately deemed to be unlawful, the
provider is still immune from liability, assuming the remainder of the statutory
scheme is satisfied. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the
FirstAmendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 33, 34-36 (2019).
&

203.
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likewise fails to give the provider knowledge of infringing material. 205
(This language is understandable given the statute's provision that a
defective notice "shall not be considered . .

in determining whether

a service provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.") 206 Even
putting aside the problematic use of "knowledge," a provider in receipt
of a defective notice may still well be in precisely the same place that
it would have been with a conforming notice. It may be aware of the
material at issue; it is now able (or not able) to make a prediction
about the material's legality regardless.
Indeed, it is particularly interesting that while the DMCA talks
about knowledge of infringement on the part of the service provider,
the copyright owner who submits a notification need only have a "good
faith belief that the use of the material in the manner complained of
is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law." 2 07 The
copyright owner can be held liable for damages if it "knowingly
materially misrepresents" that the material at issue is infringing. 208
In Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 209 the Ninth Circuit interpreted
this as a subjective test, noting that the inquiry lies "not in whether
the court would adjudge the video [at issue] as a fair use, but whether
[the copyright holder] formed a good faith belief that it was not" and,
therefore, whether the copyright holder knowingly misrepresented
that it had formed such a belief. 2 1 0 (This approach, notably, does not

focus on whether the belief turned out to be accurate.) The court went
on to hold that the willful blindness doctrine could, in appropriate
circumstances, "be used to determine whether a copyright holder
'knowingly materially misrepresent[ed]' it held a 'good faith belief
that the offending activity was not a fair use." 2 1 1 Relying on the
Supreme Court's opinion in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB

205.

See, e.g., Rosen v. Hosting Servs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (C.D.

Cal. 2010) ("Because the notice is defective, as a matter of law [by referencing a
celebrity who did not appear in the material at the URLs listed in the notice],
HSI cannot be charged with having the requisite knowledge to be contributorily

liable."); see also R. Anthony Reese, The Relationship Between the ISP Safe
Harbors and the Ordinary Rules of Copyright Liability, 32 COLUM J.L. & ARTS
427, 438 (2008) (noting that a provider does not have to take any action in
response to a statutorily defective notice, even if that notice has information that
would provide knowledge of infringement).
206. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i).
The statute further provides that if a
notification substantially complies with the requirements of identifying the
copyrighted work, identifying the infringing material, and providing contact
information for the complaining party, the service provider must promptly
contact the notifying party or take other reasonable steps to obtain a fully
(substantially) compliant notice. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii).
207. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
208. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
209. 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016).
210. Id. at 1153.
211. Id. at 1155.
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S.A., 2 12 the court concluded that a finding of willful blindness in this
context would mean that the copyright holder "subjectively believed
there was a high probability that the video constituted fair use" and
"took deliberate actions to avoid learning of this fair use." 2 1 3 So the
language establishing the nature of the copyright owner's claims is
framed in terms of belief and likelihood; it would seem odd if the
service provider's actions upon receipt of those claims were judged
according to a different mental state.
IV. KNOWLEDGE AND THE RISK OF HINDSIGHT BIAS

A.

ContributoryInfringement and Heuristics

Refraining knowledge to mean prediction of a judicial outcome
still does not tell us, however, what level of risk should trigger a
defendant's decision-making obligation. Imagine, for example, a
situation in which facts or allegations are brought to a defendant's
attention, the defendant decides not to alter its course of action, and
the underlying speech is ultimately deemed infringing. Would the
defendant's decision to take no action ever be deemed lawful under
the circumstances? If the answer is no, does that tell us something
about whether the knowledge requirement is actually operating as a
constraint on liability?
The risk is heightened in online spaces if both the reporting and
the responding processes are automated. 214 Indeed, as Niva ElkinKoren has noted, a move toward "algorithmic fair use" necessarily
entails embracing an evaluation of the probability of fair use and,
concomitantly, liability based on the reasonableness of the process
rather than the "correctness" of the conclusion. 2 15 And what is an
212. 563 U.S. 754 (2011).
213. Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1155.
214. James Grimmelman, To Err Is Platform, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST.
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/err-platform ("Courts and
commentators sometimes talk about platform passivity as a justification for
immunity. But this is best understood as a shorthand for the argument that a
truly 'passive' intermediary typically lacks the knowledge about specific harmful
content that it would need to make reliable filtering decisions.") (emphasis
omitted).
215. Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1098-99
(2017); see also Lemley, supra note 204, at 110 (" [T]here is no way to automate
the process of determining legal liability."). In a superseded opinion, the Ninth
Circuit in Lenz had proposed that copyright owners could meet their burden
under the DMCA to take fair use into account by employing algorithmic methods.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2015) ("We note,
without passing judgment, that the implementation of computer algorithms
appears to be a valid and good faith middle ground for processing a plethora of
content while still meeting the DMCA's requirements to somehow consider fair
use."), amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 815 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir.

2016); cf Laura A. Heymann, ReasonableAppropriationand Reader Response, 9
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 343, 365 n.127 (2019)

(suggesting that a "reasonable
observer" approach to the transformativeness analysis of the first fair use factor
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algorithm except an automated replication of a decision-making
process-in this case, the process that would be used by a lawyer to
determine the likelihood of infringement or fair use had she been able
to read and synthesize every prior case on the subject?
What is the problem, one might ask, with characterizing this
state of affairs as knowledge? Does it matter in the end? It's hard to
say for sure, of course, but one way in which it might matter is in the
various heuristics used in decision-making from which courts are not
immune, particularly hindsight bias and confirmation bias.
Hindsight bias-in lay terms, the "I knew it all along" effectdescribes a heuristic in which an event seems much more probable,
in hindsight, once it has happened. 2 16 It is uncomfortable to admit
that a result took us by surprise or that we changed our mind on a
topic; it is often easier to conform our recollections of what we knew
or believed in the past to what we know or believe now. Confirmation
bias is the tendency to interpret or seek out evidence to match a
conclusion one has already reached and, by contrast, to reject or
reframe evidence that runs counter to that conclusion. 2 17
Baruch Fischhoff is credited as an early proponent of a theory of
hindsight bias as a way of explaining human decision-making. In his
1975 article in the Journal of Experimental Psychology, Fischhoff
concluded that "[r]eporting an outcome's occurrence consistently
increases its perceived likelihood and alters the judged relevance of
data describing the situation preceding the event." 2 18 Notably,
however, decision makers are typically "unaware of the effect that
outcome knowledge has on their perceptions" and so "tend to believe
that this relative inevitability was largely apparent in foresight." 219
Indeed, as Daniel Kahneman writes,
A general limitation of the human mind is its imperfect ability
to reconstruct past states of knowledge, or beliefs that have
changed. Once you adopt a new view of the world (or of any part
of it), you immediately lose much of your ability to recall what
you used to believe before your mind changed. 220

"may ultimately result in limiting the scope of appellate review to assessing the
process employed by the district court rather than the result reached").
216. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeabilityand Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1630 (2009).

217.

See, e.g., Stacey Dogan, Bounded Rationality, Paternalism, and
&

Trademark Law, 56 Hous. L. REV. 269, 284-85 (2018) (citing Matthew Rabin
Joel L. Schrag, FirstImpressions Matter: A Model of ConfirmatoryBias, 114 Q.J.
ECON. 37 (1999)).
218. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight 5 Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288,
292 (1975).

219. Id. at 297.
220.

KAHNEMAN,

supra note 162, at 202.
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Studies show, moreover, that this bias exists in assessing others'
predictions as well as our own 221 and that there is likely little that
can be done to eliminate the effect of the bias on decision-making. 2 2 2
Despite this, as Jeffrey Rachlinski has noted, our legal system
often assumes that decision makers will be able to overcome the
effects of hindsight bias. 2 2 3 Every time a judge or jury is asked to
determine whether a defendant took an appropriate action at a
particular time in light of the circumstances present at that time, that
decision maker is expected to cast its mind back to before the incident
in question, uninfluenced by what it has learned since (or, indeed, by
the occurrence of the incident itself). This bias is likely to be
prevalent in situations where the question is whether the defendant
"knew or had reason to know" of a particular fact, 2 2 4 such as with
contributory copyright infringement.
Courts have been particularly attuned to the possible effect of
hindsight bias in assessing obviousness in patentability
determinations, 2 2 5 but less so, it would seem, in cases involving
copyright infringement-except perhaps to the extent courts assess
the reasonableness of a party's position in determining whether that
party is entitled to attorney's fees. 22 6 However, the issue has not
escaped the attention of scholars, who have noted, for example, that
evidence of actual copying-which comes early in the analysis-tends
to bias the decision maker in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of
infringement because of the belief that the defendant would not have
copied if that copying was not valuable to the defendant. 22 7 So it
should not be surprising if contributory infringement analysis is also
affected by the cumulative effects of hindsight bias and confirmation
bias. Having first made the determination that direct infringement
has occurred, a decision maker may well evaluate the evidence as to
knowledge in the subsequent contributory infringement analysis with
the implicit goal of confirming the correctness of its prior
determination of direct infringement. If the circumstances seem like
221. Id. at 203; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 588-90 (1998).
222. Rachlinski, supra note 221, at 603.
223. Id. at 571.
224. See id. at 591.
225. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966);
Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
HindsightBias Renders PatentDecisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 13991400 (2006).
226. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1988 (2016)
("Courts every day see reasonable defenses that ultimately fail (just as they see
reasonable claims that come to nothing); in this context, as in any other, they are
capable of distinguishing between those defenses (or claims) and the objectively
unreasonable variety. And if some court confuses the issue of liability with that
of reasonableness, its fee award should be reversed for abuse of discretion.").
227. Balganesh, supra note 216, at 1630-31 (2009); see also Irina D. Manta,
Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1339 (2012).
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evidence of obvious infringement to the court-judged many months
(or years) later, with full information, and in the reflective confines of
a courtroom-they may well seem to have been equally obvious at the
time the defendant made its decision about its own participation.
Another general consideration is that the language around
contributory copyright infringement facilitates a tendency toward
hindsight bias. For example, the characterization of evidence of
infringement as a "red flag" may well suggest to the reader of the
opinion that the infringement was obvious at the time and that any
reasonable person would have been able to predict, with near
certainty, that a court would later find infringement. This is perhaps
true in some cases, but it would be difficult to say it is true in all cases.
The other risk inherent in the effect of hindsight bias in this context
is the way in which the bias may affect the decision-making of
defendants. A defendant who is aware that a judge or jury, having
found copyright infringement, will be more likely to conclude that the
defendant knew of the infringement at the time may take more
precautions than would otherwise be warranted in order to counteract
the effect of the bias. 2 2 8 In the context of contributory infringement,
those precautions may involve removing material that ultimately
would not have been judged to be infringing. This, then, may result
in something of a feedback loop, as the additional bias of interpreting
subsequent remedial measures as evidence of wrongdoing may lead
decision makers to double down on the conclusion that the defendant
had the requisite knowledge. 229
It is, of course, difficult to identify a case in which one can say
with certainty that the combination of hindsight bias and
confirmation bias affected the outcome of the contributory
infringement determination, since as readers of opinions, we are at
risk of falling victim to the same heuristic. One example, perhaps, is
the district court's opinion in Cariou v. Prince, discussed earlier. As
the reader will recall, the case involved over twenty-five photographs
(all originally taken by Patrick Cariou) used in subsequent work by

228. Rachlinski, supra note 221, at 572, 597; see also id. at 573 (noting that
because of the effect of the bias, determining whether individual results are
unjust because of the bias is difficult).
229. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 makes inadmissible to prove negligence
post-incident measures "that would have made an earlier injury or harm less
likely to occur." FED. R. EVID. 407. This does not map squarely onto incidents of
copyright infringement-removing infringing material is not the same as, say, a
policy of inspection beforehand-but the effect may well be the same. Note that
the DMCA provides that "[t]he failure of a service provider's conduct to qualify
for limitation of liability under this section"-say, for example, by deciding not to
take down material pursuant to notice-"shall not bear adversely upon the
consideration of a defense by the service provider that the service provider's
conduct is not infringing under this title or any other defense." 17 U.S.C. § 512(1)
(2018).
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appropriation artist Richard Prince. 230 The Gagosian Gallery and
Larry Gagosian were named as defendants on both direct
infringement and secondary liability theories. 23 1 The court, as
expected, first considered the defendants' challenge to the scope of the
copyright for the photographs and the defendants' fair use
argument. 232 As to the latter, the court devoted significant time to
the propriety of Prince's actions per Second Circuit doctrine that
considers this evaluation to be "an integral part of the analysis under
the first [fair use] factor." 2 33 The district court cited Second Circuit
case law for the proposition that "it has been considered relevant
within this subfactor that a defendant could have acquired the
copyrighted [material] legitimately." 2 34 But rather than mirroring
the Second Circuit in interpreting this consideration as going to how
the defendant acquired the materials (for example, via theft or by
encouraging an authorized user to exceed the scope of authorized
access), the district court instead determined that Prince had acted
in bad faith because he had not requested a license to use the
photographs-the necessity of which, of course, was the very issue
being decided in the case. 2 35 Having decided that Prince acted in bad
faith by not seeking a license (for what the Second Circuit later
determined was largely a fair use), the district court concluded that
the Gagosian defendants equally acted with bad faith. 236 The gallery
and its owner knew that Prince was an appropriation artist but failed
to ask whether Prince had obtained a license and continued to sell the
paintings after receiving Cariou's cease-and-desist notice. 2 37 (Of
course, appropriating without asking permission, and relying on the
fair use doctrine, is largely the point of the endeavor for most
appropriation artists.)
Having rejected the defendants' fair use argument, the court
made short work of the contributory infringement analysis. 2 38 The
230. Cariouv. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d337,343 (S.D.N.Y 2011), judgment rev'd
in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
231. Id. at 354.
232. Id. at 346-47.
233. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1991)).
234. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (quoting NXIVM, 364 F.3d at 478).
235. Id. ("Prince's employee contacted the publisher of Yes, Rasta to purchase
additional copies of the book, but apparently neither Prince nor his employee ever
asked the publisher about licensing or otherwise sought permission to use Yes,
Rasta or the Photos contained therein legitimately. Nor did Prince attempt to
contact Cariou by email and inquire about usage rights to the Photos, even
though Yes, Rasta clearly identified Cariou as the sole copyright holder and even
though Cariou's publicly-accessible website includes an email address at which
he may be reached. Under these circumstances, Prince's bad faith is evident.")
(citations omitted).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The court also found the Gagosian defendants liable for direct
infringement and for vicarious infringement. Id. at 354.
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defendants were marketing and promoting Prince's work; hence, the
material contribution prong was satisfied. 239 And as to knowledge of
infringement, the court essentially rehearsed its bad faith analysis,
concluding that the defendants "were well aware of (and capitalized
on) Prince's reputation as an appropriation artist who rejects the
constricts of copyright law, but they never inquired into the propriety
of Prince's use of the Photos." 2 4 0

Notably, on appeal, the Second

Circuit did not devote any consideration to whether Prince or the
Gagosian defendants had acted in bad faith; indeed, it noted Prince's
long career as an appropriation artist and the number of museums in
which his work had been displayed-perhaps an example of hindsight
bias and confirmation bias in reverse. 241
B.

Knowing How to Know
How, then, should the doctrine respond to these concerns-both
the idea that knowledge is an inapt way to describe the decisionmaking process and the fact that heuristic biases are likely to infect
the subsequent evaluation of this process? One solution is to make
more robust the negligence aspects of the framework-to frame the
consideration not as whether the defendant knew or should have
known about infringement but rather whether the defendant's
decision to continue providing material assistance in light of available
information represented a reasonable assessment of the risk of
liability. 2 42 This may seem like mere semantics, but describing the

&

239. Id. at 354-55.
240. Id.
241. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698-99 (2d Cir. 2013). The court's
conclusion that twenty-five of Prince's works constituted fair use as a matter of
law necessitated reversing the district court's conclusion as to secondary liability
for infringement of those photographs and remanding for reconsideration of
secondary liability as to the remaining five if the district court were to find direct
infringement on remand. As noted, supra note 139, the case ultimately settled.
As to the potential effect of bias in such determinations, see Andrew Gilden
Timothy Greene, Fair Use for the Rich and Fabulous?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE
88, 98 (2013).
242. The inducement theory of contributory infringement may eliminate the
problem to some extent-in that a defendant who induces another to commit
infringement may have a strong belief that the induced activity will be deemed
to be infringement-but this still requires some level of predictive activity (and
is still subject to a risk of hindsight bias that may color the court's view of what
is considered to be inducement). Cf., e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937-38 (2005) ("It is undisputed that StreamCast
beamed onto the computer screens of users of Napster-compatible programs ads
urging the adoption of its OpenNap program, which was designed, as its name
implied, to invite the custom of patrons of Napster, then under attack in the
courts for facilitating massive infringement. Those who accepted StreamCast's
OpenNap program were offered software to perform the same services, which a
factfinder could conclude would readily have been understood in the Napster
market as the ability to download copyrighted music files.").
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fault not as knowledge but rather as predictive ability may guard
against the risk of hindsight bias described above.
Another solution-by no means a salutary one, but one that
should be acknowledged-is simply to revise the doctrine by statute
to admit that the contributory liability framework is based on notice,
not knowledge. When a copyright owner informs the operator of a
flea market that some of its vendors are engaging in copyright
infringement, the operator may not have the resources or ability to
investigate, confirm, or rebut this assertion. The operator may glean
additional facts-for example, the cover of a DVD case may look
unofficial or photocopied-but the operator is likely to be no more in
a position to conclude that infringement is taking place than it was
before receiving the notice, except in a minimum of circumstances.
This is even more true, as noted above, in an online environment,
where opportunities for additional investigation are limited. Such an
approach would have the effect of extending the notice-and-takedown
safe harbor of the DMCA to contributory infringement claims more
generally, in that a defendant would be deemed not liable for
contributory infringement if it cuts off its contribution to alleged
infringing activity upon receipt of a substantially reliable notice. 24 3
To guard against the harm that would come from a heckler's veto,
in which copyright owners would be incentivized to overnotify, such a
codification of the doctrine would need to include similar provisions
as those currently in the DMCA: the opportunity for notification of a
challenge made by the alleged direct infringer and penalties for the
knowing submission of a notice that substantially misrepresents the
legal claims at issue. Such a system may prove to be cumbersome in
certain contexts-and experience with section 512 of the DMCA
reveals the many ways in which these safeguards can fail-but it
would at least add an extra level of protection to the de facto system
that already exists, in which putative defendants, anticipating that a
court will find knowledge resulting from notice, remove access to
material upon receipt of notice, regardless of the notice's validity.
V. CONCLUSION

Characterizing the nature of the defendant's actions in
contributory infringement cases is not merely a matter of semantics.
As described above, the use of the word "knowledge" to mean what
can only be, at best, a prediction can have an effect on the decision as
to liability and may well lead courts, juries, and policy makers to
overestimate the ability of service providers to identify and respond
to problematic material on their platforms. Indeed, by describing the
kinds of evidence that justify a conclusion that the defendant had the

243. Cf Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Convergence and
Conflation in Online Copyright, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1027, 1049-66 (2020)
(criticizing the convergence of the common law and the DMCA in copyright cases).
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requisite knowledge, courts are essentially defining "knowledge" as
the existence of such evidence. In this sense, "knowledge" becomes a
legal conclusion, not a factual one, subject to renewed evaluation by
an appellate court. 2 4 4
This effect may also have implications for other forms of
secondary liability, such as the current debates-both congressional
and academic-over whether section 230 of the CDA should be
amended. Section 230 goes further than the DMCA, providing that
"[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider" and that no such provider or
user shall be liable for voluntary, good-faith actions to remove
objectionable material from a service. 245 In essence, as the Fourth
Circuit has noted, Congress recognized that the flourishing (and
realities) of the internet warranted a system in which service
providers could maintain policies and take actions regarding material
on their services without fear of liability. 2 4 6 Absent such a provision,
service providers would almost certainly err on the side of removing
material upon receipt of a complaint. Section 230, of course, thus has
the inevitable result of some amount of objectionable material
remaining online, even with the best of intentions on the part of the
service provider. Yet calls for statutory reform of section 230 to
require a provider to take steps to address "unlawful uses of its
services" seem to be overly optimistic about the ability of service
providers to make efficient and correct legal judgments about each of
the thousands (if not millions) of complaints they receive. 2 4 7 These

244.

Cf Michael S. Pardo, The Field of Evidence and the Field of Knowledge,

24 LAW & PHIL. 321, 381 (2005) ("It is not the fact that some evidence has
sufficient probative value that justifies an inference - the fact that a particular
inference is sufficiently strong means that evidence has the probative value it
does.").
245. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
246. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("The
imposition of tort liability on service providers for the communications of others
represented, for Congress, simply another form of intrusive government
regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust
nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government
interference in the medium to a minimum."); id. at 331 ("Faced with potential
liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer
service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of
messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests
implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive
effect.").
247. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAVI L. REV. 401, 419
(2017) (proposing that section 230's safe harbor be available only to a service
provider that takes "reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful uses of its
services" and defining "reasonable" (but not "unlawful") only by noting that the
determination of reasonableness "would take into account differences among
online entities"); cf Goldman, supra note 204, at 45 (noting that a safe harbor
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commentators are understandably concerned about harmful material
that has proliferated on some sites. But they have not yet explained
how service providers will know how to know. And until this
happens-both in copyright law and elsewhere-we should refrain
from calling the activity on which liability depends "knowledge."

conditioned on reasonableness "would make Section 230 litigation far less
predictable, and it would require expensive and lengthy factual inquiries into all
evidence probative of the reasonableness of [a] defendant's behavior" and "would
also cause more collateral censorship, as Internet services remove legitimate
borderline content to safely ensure a future judge might consider their efforts
'reasonable' or 'in good faith').

